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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellee Gene Peaden (hereinafter "Peaden") does not dispute that this Court has
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), to review the final
order made by the District Court which dismissed Development Associates, Inc.'s
(hereinafter "D.A.") complaint for failing to state a claim for relief on three alternative
grounds.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Are the arguments raised by D. A. concerning allegations that it was

deprived of a fair hearing before the District Court unfounded and inconsistent with the
proceeding that occurred before the District Court as reflected in the transcript of the
hearing? (A copy of the transcript is included in the addendum.)
II.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in treating Peaden's motion to

dismiss as a motion for summary judgment because of the Affidavit D.A. filed in
opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss?
III.

Did the District Court commit reversible error by not ruling on Peaden's

alternative motion for a more definite statement which became entirely moot after the
District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss?
IV.

Did the District Court error in dismissing D.A.'s complaint with prejudice

on grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment and/or
quantum meruit by alleging that Peaden was unjustly enriched through the receipt of
incidental benefits which Peaden may have received when D.A. improved its own

1

adjacent properties even though Peaden had refused to agree to pay for such
improvements before they were made?
V.

Did the District Court error in dismissing D.A.'s complaint with prejudice

on the alternative ground that even had the complaint alleged a claim for unjust
enrichment or quantum meruit, D.A.'s alleged claims for relief were barred by the
applicable four-year statute of limitations?
VI.

Did the District Court error in dismissing D.A.'s complaint with prejudice

on the second alternative ground that D.A.'s claim for equitable relief was barred by
laches, unclean hands or equitable estoppel which arose when D.A. intentionally recorded
its unlawful Notice of Interest against Peaden's property with the Salt Lake County
Recorder on January 10, 1997?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. This Court reviews the District Court's "legal
conclusions for correctness, granting [them] no particular deference." ProMax Dev.
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997).
MIXED QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. Where there are mixed questions
of law and fact and this Court is reviewing the District Court's decision as to whether the
facts come within the reach of the applicable law, this Court "review[s] legal questions
for correctness, [but] ... may grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a
given fact situation." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380,1(17, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 11
(quoting Jeff v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)); see also Jensen v. IHC
Hospitals, Inc., 2003 UT 51457, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 ("'If a case involves a mixed
2

question of fact and law, we afford some measure of discretion to the [trial] court's
application of law to facts.") (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 26, 63 P.3d 650).
CONSIDERATION OF AFFIDAVIT FILED IN OPPOSITION TO A MOTION
TO DISMISS. The District Court's decision to consider the Affidavit of Steven R.
Young which DA. filed in opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss and two certified
documents obtained from public records is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See
Tucker v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2002 UT 34, ^ 10-11, 53 P.3d 947; See In the Matter of
the General Determination of the Rights to Use of All the Water, 1999 UT 39, ^25, 982
P.2d 65; Jensen, 2003 UT 51, ^57 ("When the issue involves whether to admit or exclude
evidence, the measure of discretion is broad [and] we will not reverse a trial court's
decision unless it 'was beyond the limits of reasonability.'") (quoting State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY AND TRANSCRIPTS
The following authority and transcripts of hearings are attached as addenda hereto
pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(6).
Transcript of Motion Hearing, September 23, 2002
Transcript of Order Hearing, December 2, 2002
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(motion to dismiss)
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §106 (1936)(incidental benefit)

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Peaden, a senior citizen, purchased approximately five building lots in the Foothill
Development near Riverton, Utah for investment puiposes. The lots were sold to Peaden
as fully-developed lots. Sometime later the subdivision developer ran into financial
difficulties. Thereafter, D.A. purchased approximately 400 building lots in the Foothill
Development located in Riverton, Utah. Because D.A. had purchased several hundred
lots it planned and desired to move forward with the development of its lots and the
surrounding area. However, D.A. was unable to obtain building permits from Riverton
City unless it completed certain development activities in the area. As a result, D.A.
proceeded with some of the planned development of the area. At that time D.A.
attempted to compel Peaden to sell his lots to D.A. but Peaden refused to sell. Peaden
also refused to agree in advance to pay D.A. for its development expenses. Nevertheless,
D.A. proceeded with its development activities for its own benefit.
On January 10, 1997, D.A. recorded a Notice of Interest asserting that it had an
interest in Peaden's property as a result of alleged improvements made to various lots in
the subdivision including Peaden's. (R. 28). D.A. admitted at the hearing before the
District Court that it had not complied with the Mechanics' Lien Act for the filing of a
Notice of Lien with the County Recorder. (R. 205, p. 49 In. 23 - p. 50 In. 12). D.A. filed
a complaint for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit alleging that it was entitled to
recover damages from Peaden as a result of the improvements D.A. had made to the
development for its own benefit. (R. 1-4). Because the allegations in the complaint did
4

not state a claim for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit and because the alleged claims
were outside of the applicable four-year statute of limitations, Peaden filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint. (R. 5-7). In opposition to the motion, D.A. filed the affidavit of
its president, Steven R. Young (the "Affidavit"). (R. 34-37). The Affidavit presented
testimony which sustained the District Court's determination that the complaint failed to
state a claim for relief against Peaden. Indeed, the Affidavit clarified that Peaden had
never agreed to pay for any of the alleged development costs. (R. 35-36). At the hearing
on Peaden's motion to dismiss the District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss on
substantive grounds. (R. 144, 205 p. 53-56). Prior to the argument on the motion to
dismiss, the parties represented to the District Court that the prior issues pertaining to the
timeliness of pleadings had been resolved, that the District Court's prior minute entry
ruling based on a timeliness was to be disregarded and the District Court would consider
and rule upon the merits of Peaden's motion to dismiss. (R. 205, p. 7 In. 5-p. 8 In. 10).
Both parties agreed at the hearing that they were prepared for and that the District Court
could proceed with a hearing on the substantive issues filed in connection with Peaden's
motion to dismiss. (Id.) The District Court was very careful in indicating to D.A. that
the Court would continue the hearing if D.A. so desired. (R. 205, p. 7 In. 20-24). Both
parties agreed to go forward. (R. 205, p. 7 In. 25-p. 8 In. 3). After considering and ruling
solely upon the substantive issues, the District Court dismissed D.A.'s complaint. (R.
182-89). Notwithstanding the statements and representations made by counsel
immediately prior to the hearing, D.A. is now arguing that it was somehow deprived of a
proper adjudication of the motion. Peaden strongly disagrees.
'5

;

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On March 8, 2002, D.A. filed a complaint against Peaden for unjust enrichment or
quantum meruit. (R. 1-4). Peaden filed a motion to dismiss D.A.'s complaint for failing
to state a claim for relief. (R. 5-8). Peaden's motion was supported by a memorandum of
points and authorities (R. 9-23), and the three exhibits attached thereto which consisted of
a copy of the complaint (R. 24-27), a certified copy of a Notice of Interest which D.A.
had caused to be recorded against Peaden's property with the Salt Lake County Recorder
on January 10, 1997, (R. 28-29), and a certified copy of a Pre-Building Permit Report
prepared by Riverton City. (R. 30). In response, D.A. filed a memorandum in opposition
to the motion to dismiss. (R. 39-48). D.A. also prepared and filed the Affidavit of
Steven R. Young, who was the president of D.A. (R. 34-37). Peaden subsequently filed a
reply memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss. (R. 58-70).
Thereafter, the District Court made a minute entry granting Peaden's motion to
dismiss. (R. 83). The District Court made its ruling in part believing that no timely
opposition had been filed. (R. 83.). In response, D.A. filed a post-judgment type motion
to alter and amend the District Court's Minute Entry Decision and Order, (R. 88-106),
and Peaden filed a memorandum in opposition thereto. (R. 111-22).
A hearing was held before the District Court on September 23, 2002. (R. 205). At
the hearing, the District Court indicated that it was going to consider Peaden's motion to
dismiss without any consideration for its prior minute entry based upon the
representations by both counsel that the documents filed by D.A. should be considered as
timely filed, and that Peaden's motion should be adjudicated on the merits. (R. 205, p. 5
6

In. 16 - p. 6 In. 8). While the District Court indicated that it was willing to continue the
hearing to a later date, counsel for D.A. represented that D.A. was prepared and desired
to go forward at that time with the hearing on Peaden's motion to dismiss. (R. 205, p. 7
In. 20 - p. 8 In. 3). Based upon the consent of both counsel, the District Court heard
argument on Peaden's motion to dismiss. (R. 205 p. 5 - p. 8 In. 3).
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court granted Peaden's motion
dismissing D.A.'s complaint. (R. 205, p. 53 - p. 56). The Order Dismissing Case sets
forth three alternative grounds for dismissal. (R. 182-89). The District Court determined
that D.A.'s complaint did not state a claim for unjust enrichment against Peaden based
upon an alleged claim that Peaden was somehow unjustly enriched as a result of the
incidental improvements or increase in value made to his property as a result of D.A.'s
own development activities. (R. 186-89). In the first alternative, the District Court
ordered that D.A.'s claims were also barred by the applicable four-year statute of
limitations. (R. 186-89). In the second alternative, the District Court ordered that D.A.'s
equitable claims were barred by laches, unclean hands, and/or estoppel because D.A. had
"intentionally recorded its Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder on
[Peaden's] Property in January, 1997 even though [D.A.] knew, according to its
representations to the [District] Court, that the improvements for which the Notice of
Interest were recorded had not been made at that time." (R. 187-88). The District Court
also determined that D.A. had admittedly not complied with Utah Mechanics Lien Act,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 et. seq., and therefore its Notice of Interest was not lawfully
7

recorded against Peaden's property. (R. 188). The District Court granted Peaden's
motion to dismiss, which was converted at least in part to a motion for summary
judgment when D.A. filed the Affidavit of Steven R. Young in opposition to Peaden's
motion to dismiss. (R. 188).
On December 2, 2002, the District Court held a hearing on Peaden's proposed
order granting his motion to dismiss and D.A.'s opposition thereto. (R. 206). After
hearing the argument of counsel, the District Court made and entered its Order
Dismissing Case (R. 182-190). On December 24, 2002, D.A. filed its Notice of Appeal.
(R. 193). D.A.'s appellate brief does not cite to either of the hearing transcripts held
before the District Court and many of the statements made by D.A. are not supported by
and are inconsistent with those hearing transcripts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

D.A. filed its complaint for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit against

Peaden on March 8, 2002. (R. 1-4). The complaint alleges in relevant part as follows:
[3] Plaintiff is and has been the owner of numerous residential lots
in The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions located at approximately
13800 South and 4800 West in Salt Lake County which were unimproved
at the time they were acquired, having no approved roads, curb & gutter,
and no connections to water, sewer, power, fuel and telephone systems, and
for which it was impossible to obtain building permits for the construction
of homes thereon.
[4] Defendant was and is the owner of Lots 320, 322 and 334, The
Foothills Plat "B" Subdivision, and Lots 379, 380 and 555, The Foothills
Plat "C" subdivision, which were similarly unimproved and for which it
was impossible for defendant to obtain building permits for the construction
of homes thereon.
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[5] In order to obtain building permits on its lots, plaintiff was
required by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City to install and
complete all subdivision improvements, not just for the lots owned by it,
but for all lots located within The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions.
[6] Before proceeding to install and complete the subdivision
improvements, plaintiff contacted defendant and made defendant aware of
the requirement to install and complete all improvements in the entire
subdivisions and requested defendant to agree to reimburse plaintiff for his
share of the costs of such improvements prorated to the lots owned by him
if plaintiff installed and completed such improvements so that defendant
could obtain building permits for his lots.
[7] Defendant acknowledged the need to install such improvements
and that such improvements would benefit him and increase the value of
the lots owned by him and encouraged and requested plaintiff to proceed
with the installation of such improvements.
[8] Plaintiff thereafter completed all such improvements as required
by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City for the benefit of all lots in
The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions at a total cost of $2,381,302
for Plat "B" and $3,134,044 for Plat "C". These amounts, prorated to the
159 lots in Plat "B", equals $ 14,977.00 per lot in Plat "B", and to the 200
lots in Plat "C", equals $15,670.22. Defendant's prorata share of those
costs for his six lots is $91,941.66.
(R.l-4).
2.

On or about January 10, 1997 (which was more than four years before

D.A.'s complaint was filed), D.A. recorded a formal Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake
County Recorder as entry number 6546371 at Book 7575, Page 0892. A certified copy of
the Notice of Interest was considered by the District Court. (R. 28).
3.

The Notice of Interest asserted that D.A. was claiming an undefined interest

in a large quantity of lots in Foothills Subdivision, Plats A, B and C located in Salt Lake
County, Utah. (R. 28). The Notice of Interest provides in relevant part that "[t]he
undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts an interest in

9

subject property pursuant to their improvements and developments which benefit the
following described property:" (R. 28).
4.

D.A.'s recorded Notice of Interest was recorded against all of Peaden's five

lots. (R. 28). Peaden owned lots 320, 322, and 334 of the Foothills Plat U B" according to
the official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, and
lots 379 and 555 of the Foothills - Plat C, according to the official plat thereof, as
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder ("the Property") (R. 183-84).
After the Notice of Interest was recorded by D.A. against Peaden's Property, D.A. used
the unlawful Notice of Interest in an effort to compel Peaden to pay money to D.A. before
removing its unlawful cloud from Peaden's Property.
5.

D.A. represented to the District Court at the September 23, 2002 hearing

that the Notice of Interest recorded against Peaden's Property on January 10, 1997, was
recorded by D.A. before the improvements to plats B and C of the sub-division, which
include Peaden's Property, were made. (R. 205, p. 36 In. 6-10).
6.

D.A. owned approximately 400 of the 556 lots in the Foothill Development,

Plats A, B and C before D.A. made its improvements to the surrounding area. (R. 184).
7.

D.A.'s president, Steven R. Young, stated in his sworn affidavit filed with

the District Court that "[b]ecause the lots owned by others were interspersed among the
lots acquired by D.A., it was impossible to install the improvements to D.A.'s lots
without also installing the improvements to all lots." (R. 35, 184).
8.

D.A. also represented to the District Court at hearing, and the Affidavit of

Mr. Young confirms, that the improvements made by D.A. were made because Riverton
10

City required D.A. to make those improvements in connection with its continued
development activities, and that D.A. was unable to obtain building permits from
Riverton City to constmct upon its lots unless most of the improvements were made. (R.
35-36, 205 p. 22 In. 12-21).
9.

D.A.'s president Steven R. Young also testifies in his Affidavit that Peaden

did not agree or represent to D.A. that he would pay for the improvements to the
development made or to be made by D.A. (R. 35-36).
10.

After the briefing had been completed on Peaden's motion to dismiss,

Peaden filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on June 14, 2002, in compliance with the
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. (R. 80-82).
11.

On June 25, 2002, D.A. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Peaden's

Motion for More Definite Statement. (R. 85-87).
12.

On June 27, 2002, the District Court entered its Minute Entry Decision and

Order, dated June 26, 2002, which stated:
Before the Court is Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
dated April 8, 2002 and Defendant's Alternative Motion for More Definite
Statement filed on May 30, 2002, and submitted on its June 14, 2002
Notice to Submit for Decision.
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having noted no timely
opposition being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Motion to
Dismiss is granted. This constitutes the Order of the Court.
(R. 83-84).
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13.

On July 7, 2002, D.A. filed a Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial,

To Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment (R. 88-89), with supporting
memorandum (R. 90-100) and affidavit (R. 101-04).
14.

On July 23, 2002, Peaden filed his Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and
for Relief From Judgment. (R. 111-22).
15.

On July 25, 2002, D.A. filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion

to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and For Relief from
Judgment (R. 123-26).
16.

A hearing was held before the District Court on September 23, 2002.

(R. 136, 205). At that hearing Peaden's counsel and D.A.'s counsel acknowledged that
all pleadings pertaining to Peaden's motion to dismiss had been timely filed and that the
District Court should hear oral argument on Peaden's motion to dismiss based solely
upon the substantive issues. (R. 205, p. 5-6).
17.

The District Court indicated that if D.A.'s counsel wanted to continue the

hearing that the District Court would continue the hearing. (R. 205, p. 6 In. 14-17).
D.A.'s counsel responded that he could "go to the merits of the motion [.]" (R. 205, p. 7
In. 25 - p. 8 In. 3).
18.

D.A.'s counsel further represented to the District Court that D.A. would

have previously removed its Notice of Interest against Peaden's Property had such
request been made pursuant to the wrongful lien statute because the improvements had
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not been made to numerous lots at the time the Notice of Interest was recorded with the
Salt Lake County Recorder. (R. 205, p. 49 In. 23 - p. 50 In. 8).
19.

In addition to the foregoing, a certified copy of Riverton City's Pre-

Building Permit Report reflects that all curb, gutter, fire apparatus, road base and/or
asphalt were installed before November 11, 1997 and reflects that many of the
improvements to Foothills plat B were made before the end of 1997. (R. 30).
20.

D.A.'s complaint did not allege that Peaden had made any payment to D.A.

for any of the alleged improvements made by D.A. to the development. (R. 1-4).
21.

The District Court considered the sworn Affidavit of Steven R. Young and

other extraneous materials, and therefore, Peaden's motion was considered by the Court
as a motion for summary judgment. (R. 205, p. 51). The District Court also determined
that even without the consideration of the Affidavit and other extraneous materials, there
are grounds which would sustain dismissal of all or part of D.A.'s complaint based upon
the uncontested documents from the public record which were attached as exhibits to
Peaden's supporting memorandum. (R. 205, p. 51-56).
22.

The District Court made an order dismissing D.A.'s complaint against

Peaden on several alternative grounds for failing to state a claim for relief under Utah
law. (R. 182-89).
23.

On October 31, 2003 D.A. filed its brief before this court.

24.

D.A.'s brief makes spurious statements about the manner in which Judge

Bohling addressed and adjudicated the pending motions before the District Court.
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25.

Many, if not most, of the procedural statements and challenges made by

D.A. are directly inconsistent with the actual events which occurred at the hearing as
reflected in the hearing transcripts, complete copies of which are included in the
addendum hereto.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

D.A.'s procedural arguments are unfounded and inconsistent with the

record as reflected in the transcripts of hearing held before the District Court, which
Peaden has obtained and attached as part of the addenda hereto. The District Court
conducted a full and fair hearing on Peaden's motion to dismiss on September 23, 2002.
D.A.'s attorney was present at the hearing and agreed that the hearing could proceed at
that time on the merits of Peaden's motion to dismiss. This is true even though the
District Court expressly indicated twice that it would reschedule the hearing if D.A. so
desired.
II.

D.A.'s argument that the District Court committed reversible error in

adjudicating Peaden's motion to dismiss is groundless. The District Court received and
considered Peaden's motion to dismiss and the documents filed by D.A. in opposition
thereto. The documents were considered and discussed by the District Court and counsel
at length at the September 23, 2002 hearing before the District Court. In short, the
District Court held a full and fair hearing on Peaden's motion to dismiss.
III.

The District Court made its decision on the merits of the substantive issues

which were presented to it in the moving papers. The District Court gave no
consideration to its earlier determination and ruling that D.A.'s pleadings may not have
•14 .'

been timely filed. Counsel for both parties agreed at the September 23, 2002 hearing that
the District Court's prior minute entry would be disregarded and that the District Court
should proceed with a full hearing on the merits of Peaden's motion to dismiss without
any consideration as to the timeliness of the pleadings.
IV.

The District Court properly treated Peaden's motion to dismiss as a motion

for summary judgment because the District Court considered extraneous materials
including the Affidavit of Steven R. Young which D.A. filed in opposition to Peaden's
motion to dismiss, and the certified copy of D.A.'s own Notice of Interest and the
certified copy of the Riverton Pre-Building Report received from public records. D.A.'s
argument that it was improper for the District Court to consider the Affidavit of Steven R.
Young, which was filed by the D.A. in an effort to oppose Peaden's motion to dismiss, is
unfounded. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering the Affidavit of
Steven R. Young and the two certified public records when it granted Peaden's motion to
dismiss.
V.

The District Court properly dismissed D.A.'s complaint for failing to state a

claim for relief on three independent or mutually exclusive grounds.
1. The complaint did not state a claim for relief for unjust enrichment
under Utah law The Restatement of Restitution § 106 provides that "[a] person who,
incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or the
improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby
entitled to contribution." Based upon the foregoing, the District Court concluded
that D.A. failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment against Peaden under Utah
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law. The indirect benefits which Peaden received from D.A.'s own work were
merely incidental benefits, which occurred when D.A. undertook to make
improvements to the development for its own business purposes.
2.

The alleged claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Even if

the complaint stated a claim for relief for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit
and/or an implied in fact contract, the four-year statute of limitations for any such
claim expired pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25. The facts are undisputed
that Peaden never made any payment to D.A., and therefore the statute of
limitations would have begun to run when D.A. first had a claim for relief that
could have been alleged against Peaden for the improvements. Such time should
have been no later than the date upon which D.A. filed its Notice of Interest on the
public records of Salt Lake County, and in no event later than the date when the
improvements were later made in 1997.
3.

Even if the complaint stated a claim for unjust or an implied in fact

contract and the claims were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
D.A. is not entitled to a claim in equity against Peaden because of its unclean
hands. This is based upon the undisputed fact that D.A. intentionally recorded its
Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder on Peaden's Property in
January 1997 even though D.A. knew, according to its representations to the
District Court, that the improvements for which the Notice of Interest were
recorded had not been made at the time the Notice of Interest was recorded.
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VI.

Utah law does not allow for the filing of a notice of interest against

another's property for alleged incidental improvements made to or alleged increases in
value conferred upon the neighboring property. The District Court accurately concluded
that the proper method for filing a lien against another's property for improvements made
thereto should be made pursuant to the procedures provided for in Utah Mechanics Lien
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 et seq. The District Court concluded and D.A. admitted
Court at hearing that it had not complied with the Act and that it was asserting no claim
thereunder.
VII.

D.A.'s proposed amended complaint, which alleged only two additional

sentences, also failed to state a claim for relief for the same reasons set forth in the
District Court's Order Dismissing Case.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DISTRICT COURT CONDUCTED A FULL
AND FAIR HEARING ON PEADEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS
The District Court handled the proceedings below fairly and in accordance with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. D.A.'s
accusations of the District Court's bias and disingenuous statements are groundless and
stand in stark contrast to how the District Court actually handled the matter as reflected in
the September 23, 2003 hearing transcript.
The District Court had originally granted Peaden's motion to dismiss D.A.'s
complaint on June 26, 2002, for lack of what it believed was a timely response. Once the
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timeliness issue was resolved by both counsel at the September 23, 2003 hearing, the
District Court was clear that it was going to conduct a full hearing on the merits of
Peaden's motion to dismiss. (R. 205, p. 5 In. 18 - p. 6 In. 8). D.A. consented to that
procedure. Moreover, the District Court allowed D.A. the opportunity to continue the
hearing on Peaden's motion to dismiss to a later date if D.A.'s counsel so desired. (R.
205, p. 6 In. 14-17). The District Court's discussion with D.A.'s counsel was as follows:
THE COURT: It would. And if you're prepared to proceed on the
merits, the Court is as well. On the other hand, if you - if you are
unprepared and just want to set this again, it's up to you, Mr. Marsh.
MR. MARSH: On the merits, are you speaking of the merits on our
Motion to Dismiss?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MARSH: On their Motion to Dismiss?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MARSH: That was not noticed for today, and I did not submit
courtesy copies of those documents to the Court, nor did I actually prepare
for that motion, I was simply prepared to address our motion to set that
aside.
THE COURT: All right. I don't even think you're opposing that;
are you, Counsel?
MR. CALL: We had opposed it, and we did submit courtesy copies
on the merits, and I - I - 1 do think that this was - the substance of the
issues were addressed in the memorandum in opposition to Motion to
Vacate.
We addressed - We stated in our opposition to his Motion to Vacate
that we weren't objecting to any of the timeliness issues, but that we
address specifically the merits of the Court's ruling.
So I guess it would be my position that the merits are before the
Court today, because that was - the only response that we made to his
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motion was we agreed everything is timely, but we - we agreed that the
Court can look at the merits and that there's no basis for a claim.
THE COURT: Well, is it - there has been this issue, and frankly, I
wanted to recognize that I understand Mr. Marsh's position here, and if you
would be more comfortable rescheduling, fine, if you want to go to the
merits, I'm prepared and I think Counsel is.
MR. MARSH: Well, I believe I can go to the merits of the motion,
in which case that would be Mr. Call's motion, and he should address it
first I suppose.
MR. CALL: All right.
THE COURT: That's fine. But, again it's really your decision, Mr.
Marsh.
MR. MARSH: Well, I appreciate that, and does that clarify things
for me, and it means I have merits to discuss and not - not the timeliness
issue.
THE COURT: All right.
(R. 205, p. 5 In. 18 - p . 8 In. 10) (emphasis added).
There was nothing irregular in the foregoing proceedings that could warrant
a reversal of the District Court's ruling. D.A. had a full and complete opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of its case. See Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 2>11
P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962) ("The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play,
favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merit of
every case."). D.A.'s counsel was also given the opportunity to reschedule the
September 23, 2002 hearing if he chose. Instead, D.A. chose to proceed and argue
Peaden's motion to dismiss on the merits at that time. ]

D.A. also complains that the District Court erred in not holding a hearing on Peaden's
motion to dismiss prior to the District Court's minute entry. The argument is moot. The
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION WAS
BASED UPON THE MERITS OF THE CASE
Peaden strongly disputes D.A.'s repeated argument that the District Court made its
decision based on the fact that D.A.'s memorandum in opposition to Peaden's alternative
motion had not been filed. This was unequivocally clarified at the September 23,2002
hearing as follows:
MR. MARSH: On June 26th the Court signed a minute entry
decision and order which states, before the Court is Notice to Submit
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated April 8th, 2002 and Defendant's
alternative Motion for Definite Statement filed May 30, 2002 and submitted
on its June 14, 2002 Notice to Submit for Decision.
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having no timely
opposition being filed and good files appearing, the Motion to Dismiss is
granted. This constitutes the order of the Court.
THE COURT: Counsel, just so we can get right to the heart of
where we're at today, I see this as a motion on the merits.
I'm not going to hold you to the problem, that, as a matter of fact,
there - there seem to have been other incidences where someone is late, and
I'll get - I'll get submitted to me on no response an opportunity to rule on
it, and simply do that.

District Court and opposing counsel consulted and agreed that the District Court's default
type minute entry would be disregarded and that the District Court would rule on the
merits of Peaden's motion to dismiss without consideration of any timeliness issues or
the District Court's prior minute entry. The District Court never ruled on Peaden's
alternative motion because it became moot when the District Court granted Peaden's
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the District Court's failure to consider D.A.'s memo in
opposition to Peaden's alternative motion is inconsequential and irrelevant. Furthermore,
this defect, if there was one, was corrected when the District Court held a hearing on
September 23, 2002.
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But if it turns out there's - that there are a couple of days delay and
everybody has filed their items, I routinely just vacate that and hear the
matter on the merits. And so that's where we're at today.
MR. MARSH: Okay. I ' m THE COURT: I'm not going to hold you to the fact that you were a
couple days late, it certainly isn't something that I think the other side is
seeking to take advantage of. I'm willing to just hear this matter on its
merits.
(R. 205, p. 5 In. 6 - p. 6 In. 8) (emphasis added). The District Court did hear Peaden's
motion solely on the merits, and D.A.'s argument to the contrary is unfounded.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED D.A.'S
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM AND THE
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. YOUNG
There is no merit to the argument that the District Court did not review or consider
D.A.'s opposition papers. The hearing transcript (attached) reflects that the District
Court read the opposing papers and the Affidavit of Steven R. Young. In addition the
Notice to Submit reflects D.A.'s opposition memorandum and Affidavit of Steven R.
Young as documents filed in opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss. The Notice to
Submit provides in part:
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (1)(D) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, Defendant Gene Peaden, by and through his counsel,
Steven W. Call of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, hereby requests that Peaden's
Motion to Dismiss, filed on April 8, 2002 and Peaden's Alternative Motion
for More Definite Statement filed on May 30, 2002 be submitted to the
Court for decision. Oral argument has been requested by one or more of
the parties. The following pleadings or documents have been filed with the
Court and are relevant to the pending motions:
Defendant Gene Peaden's Court Documents:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Peaden Peaden's Motion to Dismiss;
Memorandum in Support of Peaden's Motion to Dismiss;
Reply Memorandum in Support ofPeaden's Motion to Dismiss;
Peaden's Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement; and
Memorandum in Opposition to D.A.'s Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint and in Support of Peaden's Alternative Motion
for More Definite Statement.

Plaintiff Development Associates, Inc.'s Court Documents:
1.
2.
3.

Memorandum in Opposition to Peaden's Motion to Dismiss;
Affidavit of Steven R. Young in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss; and
Motion for Leave to File Amend Complaint.

(R. 80-81) (emphasis added).
The foregoing Notice to Submit indicates that the District Court was aware of and did in
fact consider D.A.'s opposition memorandum and the Affidavit of Steven R. Young filed
in opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss.
1.

THERE WAS NO IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT.

The opposition memorandum and Affidavit of Steven R. Young, which were filed
in opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss, were served on April 25, 2002. On May 30,
2002, Peaden served a reply memorandum in response thereto and in support of his
motion to dismiss. The notice to submit was filed with the District Court on or about
June 14, 2002. The District Court's original minute entry was not made until June 26,

2

Again, the only pleading that the District Court may not have considered was D.A.'s
opposition memorandum to Peaden's alternative motion for more definite statement.
However, the alternative motion was not ruled upon by the District Court because the
District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss, thereby making Peaden's alternative
motion for a more definite statement moot.
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2002 which was 12 days after Peaden's notice to submit was made. Peaden's motion to
dismiss had been fully briefed by both parties at the time the District Court made its
initial ruling. Thus, there was simply no irregularity in connection with the briefing
before the District Court.
2.

THERE WAS NO SURPRISE.

The issue before the District Court was Peaden's motion to dismiss. The District
Court did not rule on Peaden's alternative motion for a more definite statement. Instead
the District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss. Because the motion to dismiss
was granted, the District Court did not reach or address Peaden's alternative motion for a
more definite statement. It is illogical for D.A. to suggest that because the District Court
did not consider an untimely pleading in connection with Peaden's alternative motion for
a more definite statement, that the District Court's ruling on Peaden's motion to dismiss
was somehow defective. The argument is simply a red herring which seeks to create a
basis for alteration or amendment when no other legal or factual basis supports such.
POINTIV
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
The District Court's ruling is fully supported by the record.3 D.A.'s president
Steven R. Young, submitted a sworn affidavit in opposition to Peaden's motion to
dismiss, but the facts set forth in his Affidavit sustain the District Court's ruling

It is inaccurate for D.A. to suggest that a motion to dismiss must be supported by an
affidavit. Indeed, such is not the law in Utah. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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dismissing D.A.'s complaint. In addition to the Affidavit, the Notice of Interest which
D.A. prepared and recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder was attached as
Peaden's Exhibit B. (R. 28). The Notice of Interest reflects that D.A. was claiming an
interest in a large quantity of lots in Foothills Subdivision, Plats A, B and C located in
Salt Lake County, Utah. The Notice of Interest provides in relevant part that "[t]he
undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts an interest in
subject property pursuant to their improvements and developments which benefit the
following described property:" (R. 28). In its opposition memorandum to Peaden's
motion, D.A. did not dispute the facts as set forth in relevant portions of Peaden's
statement of relevant facts, nor did it dispute the authenticity of the two certified copies
of D.A.'s own Notice of Interest and the Pre-Building Permit Report presented to the
District Court. Riveiton City's Pre-Building Permit Report, which was submitted as
Exhibit C, reflects that all curb, gutter, fire apparatus, road base and/or asphalt were
installed before November 11, 1997. (R. 30).
It is simply inaccurate for D.A. to argue that there is no evidence to sustain the
District Court's dismissal of the case. The dismissal was based upon the allegations in
the complaint, the Affidavit of Steven R. Young (which D.A. submitted), the certified
copy of D.A.'s Notice of Interest and the certified copy of the Pre-Building Permit
Report, the representations set forth in the pleadings and the representations made by
D.A.'s counsel at the September 23, 2002, hearing. In sum, the District Court's ruling is
fully supported by the record.
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POINT V
D.A.'S COMPLAINT FAILED TO
STATE A CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
D.A.'s complaint failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit
under Utah law. The RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §1 provides that a person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this doctrine. See Harline v. Dairies, 567 P.2d 1120
(Utah 1977). Unjust enrichment may be an appropriate remedy if property or services are
conferred upon one person by another, the recipient appreciates or has knowledge of such
property or services, the person receiving the property or services accepts such benefit and it
would be "inequitable" for the person receiving the property or services to keep the same
without being required to pay therefor. See Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT
83, 12 P.3d 580; Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984); See L & A Drywall v.
Miitmore Constr.Co., 608 P.2d 626, 630 (Utah 1980).
The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply anytime the benefits are performed
by the plaintiff for its own advantage. See Baugh v. Darley, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947).
The Restatement of Restitution explains the law as follows:
§ 106. Incidental Benefit to Another from Performance of One's Duty or
Protection of One's Things.
A person who, incidentally to the performance of his
own duty or to the protection or the improvement of his
own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not
thereby entitled to contribution.
Illustrations:
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1.
A, the owner of land on a river bank, reasonably
fearing immediate inundation, requests his neighbor, B, to join
him in building a dike which will preserve the land of both. B
refuses. A builds a dike which saves both pieces of land from
being flooded. A is not entitled to contribution from B.
2.
A and B are adjoining mine owners whose mines
have been flooded by seepage from a near-by swamp. A
requests B to join him in the draining of the swamp. B refuses.
A drains the swamp, thereby drying both mines. He is not
entitled to contribution from B.
3.
Same facts as in Illustration 2, except that C had
contracted to keep water out of A's mine, and he drains the
swamp in the performance of his duty to A. C is not entitled to
contribution from B.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§ 106 (attached).

The Utah Remedies Guide also explains the law that a plaintiff is precluded from
recovering for services performed or benefits furnished for the plaintiffs own advantage.
However, unjust enrichment does not apply anytime someone has benefited to
another's detriment. In particular, the courts are not inclined to provide
restitution for benefits "officiously or gratuitously furnished" or "services
performed by the plaintiff for his own advantage".
D.N. Zillman, Utah Remedies Guide, Restitution, §11 at 403 (1985 ed.).
1.

PEADEN HAS NOT RETAINED MONEY OR BENEFITS WHICH
BELONG TO ANOTHER

There is nothing alleged in the complaint that suggests that Peaden is retaining any
money or benefits which belong to D. A.. Moreover, the complaint specifies that the
improvements were made by D.A. so that D.A. could promptly obtain building permits
from Riverton City to build on its own properties. (R. 2). A party which makes
development type improvements for its own purpose is not entitled to recover from others
for the expense of such improvements.
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The law was explained in Major-Blakeney Corp., 263 P.2d 655 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1954), where the court addressed the issue of unjust enrichment in a real estate development
case and stated:
Furthermore, there is another aspect of this matter, which is of extreme
significance in the context here present. The evidence and its reasonable
inferences demonstrate that the improvements were undertaken as a part
of plaintiff s own building program, that they were initiated without
reference to any agreement with defendant's concerning the properties
here in dispute, that defendants at no time remotely suggested they
would pay for or contribute to these improvements made adjacent to or
abutting other properties they chanced to own. The whole situation
negatives the idea that defendants were expected to participate
financially, and any benefit that could possibly have flowed to defendants
was incidental to plans and obligations to which plaintiff alone had
committed itself. The general rule applicable, absent other equities, is
that a party is not entitled to reimbursement for improvements
voluntarily made to another's land in the absence of an express or
implied contract to pay. Callnon v. Callnon, 7 Cal.App.2d 676, 680, 46
P.2d 988; Titus v. Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa. 431, 119 A. 540; Meeker v.
Oszust, 307 Mass. 366, 30 N.E.2d 246; Dudzick v. Lewis, 175 Tenn. 246, 133
S.W.2d 496. A related principle, particularly applicable to the instant case, is
adopted by the Restatement of Restitution, sec. 106, in the following
language: yA person who, incidentally to the performance of his own duty
or to the protection or the improvement of his own things, has conferred
a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to contribution/ The
courts of many jurisdictions support this proposition. Raynor v. Drew, 72
Cal. 307, 13 P. 866; United States v. Pac. R. Co., 120 U.S. 227, 7 S.Ct. 490,
30 L.Ed. 634; Wadleigh v. Katahdin Pulp & Paper Co., 116 Me. 107, 100 A.
150; Stern v. Haas, 54 N.D. 346, 209 N.W. 784. A property owner who
conceivably acquires some incidental benefit from an adjoining
landowner's improvements made pursuant to the latter's private
development plans is not required to account for the benefits so received.
Major-Blakeney Corp., 263 P.2d at 664 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court also recognized the foregoing doctrine in Berrett v.
Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, (Utah 1984) wherein the Court stated:
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There is little doubt that plaintiffs did receive some benefit from defendants'
action. However, the mere fact that a person benefits another is not by itself
sufficient to require the other to make restitution. The value of the services
performed by a person for his own advantage and from which another
benefits incidentally are not recoverable.
690 P.2d at 558 (emphasis added); accord Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335
(1947).
The facts in the instant case are comparable to those in Major-Blakeney Corp. D.A.
owned approximately 400 lots in the Foothills Subdivision which it obtained from the
financially troubled developer. D.A. made improvements to the area in an effort to improve
and develop its own lots for sale. Peaden was not involved in that improvement process,
nor was he requested to give approval or make decisions in connection with the
improvements undertaken by D.A. Thus, any benefit conferred upon Peaden's five lots was
merely incidental to the improvements which the D.A. made for its own benefit. As such,
D.A. may not recover against Peaden for any such alleged incidental benefits conferred
upon Peaden.
2.

GENE PEADEN DID NOT REQUEST THAT THE IMPROVEMENTS
BE MADE TO HIS PROPERTIES

Sometime before the alleged improvements to the overall development were made in
1997, D.A.'s agent, Milt Shipp, contacted Peaden and requested that he sell his property to
D.A. for approximately $3,000 a lot. Peaden indicated that he was not interested in selling
his lots for that price. Thereafter, D.A.'s agent made statements that D.A. owned a great
many lots in the development and that it was planning to make improvements to the
development, and that D.A. may be seeking Peaden's involvement in the development
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process. However, Peaden did not request that the improvements be made and at no time
did D.A. get Peaden involved in connection with the improvements made by D.A.
3.

PEADEN DID NOT AGREE TO PAY FOR GENERAL
IMPROVEMENTS WHICH D.A. WANTED TO MAKE TO THE
DEVELOPMENT

The facts are undisputed that Peaden did not agree to pay for any of the alleged
improvements made by D.A. Indeed, D.A.'s president, Steven R. Young, testifies in his
Affidavit that Peaden did not agree to pay for the general improvements made by the D.A.
All of the other owners, either before or after the improvements were
completed, acknowledged the benefit to them of the improvements and
agreed either to sell their lots or to participate in the costs on a prorata basis
except for the owners of eight lots, including those owned by Peaden
Gene Peaden.
(R. 35-36) (emphasis added). Clearly, Peaden did not agree to pay D.A. for its development
improvements.
4.

PEADEN HAS NOT RETAINED MONEY OR BENEFITS WHICH
BELONG TO D.A.

Peaden has not retained any money or benefits which belong to D.A. The benefits
were performed by D.A. for its own business purposes. Indeed, D.A.'s president, Steven R.
Young, testifies in his Affidavit that:
Because the lots owned by others were interspersed among the lots
acquired by us, it was impossible to install the improvements to our lots
without also installing the improvements to all lots."
(R. 35-36).
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5.

D.A. DID NOT RELY TO ITS DETRIMENT UPON ANY ALLEGED
REQUEST FOR IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY PEADEN

Even had some representation been made that Peaden would share in D.A.'s
development costs (which it was not), D.A. could not have relied upon that representation to
its detriment. Indeed, D.A.'s president has testified that Peaden did not agree or represent
that he would pay for improvements and that D.A. was required by Riverton City to make
the improvements to the development, and that there was no way of separating the
improvements between lots. Thus, D.A. elected to go forward with the improvements
knowing that other lots owners did not agree therewith.
6.

JUSTICE DOES NOT REQUIRE PEADEN TO PAY MONEY TO D.A.

D.A. made the improvements to the Foothill Development knowing that the Peaden
did not agree to pay for any portion thereof. D.A., as a developer, purchased most of the
lots in a development and thereafter made improvements to the Development for its ov/n
benefit and profit. The work benefited all of D.A.'s 400 lots because it allowed D.A. to
obtain building permits from Riverton City to move forward with its development plans.
D.A. is now seeking recovery from Peaden simply to increase its profitability on the
project which D.A. undertook for its own financial interest and benefit. It would be a
miscarriage of justice and an attack on public policy for this Court to allow a large
commercial developer to recover from a private senior citizen under the facts of this case.
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POINT VI
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS D.A.'S
CLAIMS FOR IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO LOTS 320, 322 AND 334
D.A.'s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The four-year statute of
limitations in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 applies to all claims in equity. The statute
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument
in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and
for any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for
work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that
action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within
four years after the last payment is received.

(3)

for relief not otherwise provided for by law.4

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(emphasis added).
Based upon the foregoing, any claim for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit for
the alleged improvements had to be brought, if at all, within four years after the alleged
improvements were made. However, D.A.'s complaint was not filed until March 2002
which was after the four-year period expired. Therefore, D.A. could not have asserted a
claim against Peaden for incidental improvements made before March 1998. As such,
D.A.'s claims for relief based upon improvements made directly or indirectly to Peaden's

The four-year limitation prescribed by sub-section (3) was the proper limitation period
applicable in action by subdividers for fees paid under a municipal ordinance.
American Tierra Corp. v. City ofW. Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992).
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lots 320, 322 and 332 in 1997 were untimely and properly dismissed by the District
Court.
The improvements made directly or indirectly to lots 320, 322 and 334 of Foothills
Plat "B" Subdivision were also made in 1997. Indeed, a certified copy of the PreB nilding Permit Report, reflects the subject improvements were completed in 1997. (R.
30). In addition, the Notice of Interest, which was prepared by D.A. and recorded with
the Salt Lake County Recorder on January 10, 1997, reflects unambiguously on its face
that D.A. was reattempting to assert an interest or claim against Peaden's properties for
improvements it had made to numerous properties.* (R.28).
D.A. argues that even though the Notice of Interest was recorded on January 10,
1997, the improvements reflected in the Notice related to future work. However, the
Notice of Interest reflects unambiguously on its face that D.A. was attempting to assert a
present claim for improvements that had been made. The Notice provides, in part, as
follows:
The undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts
an interest in subject property pursuant to their improvements and
developments which benefit the following described property.
(R. 28). Because the Notice of Interest was recorded on January 10, 1997 and because
D.A. did not file the present action until March 8, 2002, all improvements referred to in

3

The Notice of Interest filed by the D.A. is unlawful because Utah law does not provide
for the filing of a notice of interest in an effort to recover for improvements made to
property. Indeed, the proper procedure for asserting a lien for improvements to real
property is set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1. Notwithstanding, D.A.'s Notice of
Interest conclusively reflects the D.A.'s public representation as to when the alleged
improvements were made.
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the Notice of Interest and any other improvements made to Peaden's lots before March 8,
1998, were barred by the four year statute of limitations as a matter of law.
POINT VII
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALSO BARS
ANY CLAIMS FOR IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO LOTS 379 AND 555
The applicable statute of limitations also bars D.A.'s claims for improvements
made, directly or indirectly, to lots 379 and 555 because both lots are identified in the
Notice of Interest, paragraph 3, which asserted a claim for such improvements in 1997.
(R. 28). As such, any claim by D.A. for improvements made to those lots in 1997 were
barred by the four-year statute of limitations under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 as a
matter of law before D.A. filed its complaint on March 8, 2002.
POINT VIII

THERE IS NO ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT CLAIM
1.

ANY CLAIM FOR AN IMPLIED CONTRACT IS ALSO BARRED BY
THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

An oral or implied-in-fact contract is subject to the four-year statute of limitations set
forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25. The statute states that an action upon a contract,
obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing . . . must be brought
within four years. Id. Because D.A. made the alleged improvements to Peaden's
properties in 1997, a claim upon any such alleged contract must have been brought within
four years. Therefore, even had an implied contract existed between the parties, the time for
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asserting a claim based thereon is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore,
D.A.'s claim based upon an oral or implied-in-fact contract was untimely as matter of law.6
2.

THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT
CONTRACT

Even if the statute of limitations for enforcing an implied-in-fact contract had not
expired (which it had), there is no factual basis to sustain an implied-in-fact contract claim.
Under Utah law, the elements needed to establish an implied-in-fact contract are: (1)
Peaden requested D.A. to perform the work; (2) DA. expected Peaden to compensate it for
the work requested; and (3) Peaden knew or should have known that D.A. expected
compensation for such work. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
None of the foregoing elements is satisfied in this case. First, Peaden did not request
that the work be done.
Second, D.A.'s president, Steven R. Young, testifies in his affidavit that there was no
agreement reached with Peaden. He testifies that:
Riverton City required us to install improvements in the entire
subdivisions to their current standards (as opposed to the standards in place
when the subdivision was approved and recorded). Before doing so, we tried
to contact all of the owners of the other lots to either purchase their lots or
obtain their agreement to participate in the costs of the improvements. AH of
the other owners, either before or after the improvements were completed,
acknowledged the benefit to them of the improvements and agreed either to

6

In this action, D.A. asserts unequivocally in Point V of its brief below that "the elements
of an implied-in-fact contract are present here". (R. 42). Because D.A. contends that such
a contract existed, no claim for unjust enrichment may be brought as a matter of law. See
Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in
quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject
matter of the litigation"); American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996).
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sell their lots or to participate in the costs on a prorata basis except for the
owners of eight lots, including those owned by Peaden Gene Peaden.
(R. 35-36) (emphasis added). The foregoing testimony makes it clear that Peaden did not
agree to pay for the development costs incurred by D.A.. As such, D.A. could have not
been led to believe that there was an implied-in-fact contract made between the parties as a
matter of law.
Third, D.A. could not have expected Peaden to compensate it without some
agreement to do so, and Peaden did not know, nor should he have expected, an obligation to
compensate D.A. for work performed by D.A. for its own purposes so it could promptly
obtain building permits from Riverton City. (R. 2). This is especially true where D.A. did
the work without Peaden's consent, participation or involvement therein.
POINTIX
D.A.'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY DOCTRINES OF
LACHES, UNCLEAN HANDS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
A party seeking equity must do so with clean hands. See LHIW, Inc. v. Dehor'ean,
753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988).; Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 139 (Utah
1976); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). The doctrine has been
described as follows:
No maxim of equity is older or more venerated than 'He who seeks
redress in a court of equity must come with clean hands.' The very
foundation of equity is good conscience, and any conduct in connection
with the matter in controversy, which does not comport with good
conscience, should preclude any relief being granted to [petitioner]. ...
Misconduct which will bar relief in a court of equity need not necessarily
be of such nature as to be punishable as crime or to constitute the basis of
legal action. Under this maxim, any willful act in regard to the matter
in litigation, which would be condemned and pronounced wrongful by
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honest and fair-minded men, will be sufficient to make the hands of the
applicant unclean.'"
Dowse v. Kammerman, 246 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1952) (Crockett, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
In the present case, D.A.'s president testifies that D.A. did not commence its
development activities to sub-division C until November of 1997. (R. 35).
Assuming that the foregoing testimony is true, D.A. had not commenced any
development of sub-division C until November 1997. Nevertheless, D.A. recorded a Notice
of Interest asserting a present claim for such improvements in January of 1997. (R. 28).
Thus, the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien which the D.A. knew was wrongful at the
time it was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder. Thus, D.A. does not have clean
hands and is therefore precluded from asserting a claim for unjust enrichment as a matter of
law.7
POINTX
D.A. FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW
FOR THE RECOVERY OF IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO LAND
The Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1, et seq., sets forth the
procedure by which a person may file a notice of lien so he can recover for improvements
made to real property. However, D.A. did not comply with the foregoing Act.
7

D.A. is in a no win situation. If it alleges that the incidental improvements were
made at the time it recorded its improper Notice of Interest on January 10, 1997 against
Peaden's Property, then the four-year statute of limitations bars its alleged claims.
Conversely, if D.A. alleges that the alleged improvements were made in 1997, then the
Notice of Interest, (which is not authorized by law) is clearly a malicious slander of title
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D.A. does not dispute that the Utah mechanic's lien statute sets forth the proper
procedure by which a person may record a notice of lien to recover for improvements made
to land. D.A. also does not dispute that it did not record a notice of lien under Utah
Mechanic's Lien Statute. Instead, D.A. contends that the Act is inapplicable to its claim.
However, what D.A. fails to recognize is that under Utah law a person may only record a
notice of interest if it is allowed by law. Utah law defines a "wrongful lien" as:
any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's
interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or
statutes; or
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by
the owner of the real property.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-9-1 (1997).

The facts are undisputed that there is no statute which authorized the recording of the
Notice of Interest against Peaden's Property. The facts are undisputed that no judgment or
order was ever entered which authorized D.A. to record a notice of interest against Peaden's
Property, and the facts are not disputed that the Peaden never signed a document which
allowed D.A. to record its Notice of Interest against Peaden's Property. D.A. also admitted
that it did not record its Notice of Interest under the Mechanics' Lien Act, and D.A. has not
asserted any other statutory basis authorizing the Notice of Interest. Therefore, the Notice of

to Peaden's Property. Under either scenario, D.A.'s alleged claim fails as a matter of
law.
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Interest was a wrongful lien as a matter of law thereby precluding D.A.'s right to assert a
claim in equity against Peaden or his Property as a matter of law.
POINT XI
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF GOOD CAUSE
IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
There facts are sufficiently clear to support the District Court's finding of "good
cause" for the dismissal of the action. Indeed, the following fully support the District
Court's ruling:
(a)

The allegations made in the complaint (which were presumed true);

(b)

The Affidavit of D.A.'s president, Steven R. Young, which sustains the facts
set forth above in the analysis of facts;

(c)

The certified copy of Notice of Interest, made and recorded by the D.A. on
January 10, 1997, and the statements and representations made therein;

(d)

The certified copy of Pre-Building Report prepared by Riverton City;

(e)

The facts represented by the D.A. in its pleadings; and

(f)

The representations of facts made by D.A. at the hearings before the Court.
POINT XII
THE EXTRINSIC DOCUMENTS WERE
PROPERLY CONSIDERED BY THE COURT

D.A. cites two Utah cases (i.e., Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d
1055, 1058 (Utah 1991) and Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995)) and
argues that once the District Court decides to consider outside materials, the non-moving
party should be given an opportunity to respond to those materials. In this case the outside
materials consisted of D.A.'s own affidavit, a certified copy of its own Notice of Interest
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and a certified copy of Riverton City's Pre-Building Report. No other outside materials
were considered by the District Court. The District Court's consideration of these
documents was indeed proper and D.A.'s objection thereto is unfounded.
POINT XIII
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b)
There is no basis for relief from the District Court's order under Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated above, this Court's decision was
based upon the merits of the case, and not upon a two-day delay in the filing of a response
to Peaden's alternative motion for a more definite statement, which became moot once the
District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss. Moreover, even if the District Court
should have considered the untimely pleading filed by D.A., its failure to do so is simply
"harmless error". Utah R. Civ. P. 618 requires the District Court to disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Based upon the foregoing, D.A.'s memorandum in opposition to Peaden's alternative
motion for more definite statement became meaningless after the District Court granted
Peaden's motion to dismiss, and was properly disregarded by the District Court.

Rule 61. Harmless error. No error . . . or defect in any ruling or order or in anything
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
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POINT XIV
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY TREATED
THE MOTION AS ONE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering matters outside the
pleadings. UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides in relevant part as follows:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
In this action, the District did receive and consider the Affidavit of Steven R. Young,
which D.A. had filed with the Court in opposition to Peaden's motion. The only other
outside materials considered were D.A.'s Notice of Interest recorded January 10, 1997 and a
certified copy of the Pre-Building Report from Riverton City. Surely, D.A. cannot
complain that the Court acted improperly by receiving D.A.'s Affidavit and D.A.'s own
Notice of Interest which it recorded with the County Recorder.
POINT XV
D.A.'s AMENDED COMPLAINT
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF
On April 25, 2002, D.A. filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint,
(R. 49), together with the proposed amended complaint. (R. 51-55). While the proposed
amended complaint did not add any new allegations, it alleged the following additional
claim "[pjlaintiff is entitled to have an equitable lien impressed upon the lots owned by
defendants to secure payment of the amounts due plaintiff hereunder." (R. 54).
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The adding of the foregoing sentence to the original complaint does not preclude
dismissal based upon the ruling of the District Court. The allegations set forth in the
amended complaint do not state a timely claim for an "equitable lien" under Utah law. In
addition, the same four-year statute of limitations bars any claim of an alleged equitable
lien. American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1992).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the District Court's order dismissing D.A.'s complaint
should be affirmed as a matter of law.
DATED this CB*-P day of February, 2004.

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Steven W. Call
Benjamin J. Kotter
Attorneys for Appellee Gene Peaden

41

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF

A
THE APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, on this ZS day of February, 2004 to the
following:
Ralph J. Marsh
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

_

745818v8

1

Hearing Transcript
(Motion)

Page 1
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF UTAH

* * * * *

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES,
INC. ,
HEARING

Plaintiff,

vs.

*

GENE PEADEN,

*

Defendant.

Case No.

020902121

*

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 23rd day of

September, 2002, commencing at the hour of 10:30 a.m.,

the Hearing in the above-entitled matter was held
at the above-entitled Court, Salt Lake City, Utah.
This Hearing was electronically recorded.

muiu-rage
Page 2
A P P E A R A N C E S

For t h e
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Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4 5385
Salt Lake City, UT
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is Case No. 020902121.

Counsel, would you enter your appearances, please?
MR. MARSH:
MR. CALL:

Ralph Marsh for the Plaintiff.
Steven Call on behalf of the

Defendant, Gene Peaden, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
MR. MARSH:
MR. CALL:

I'll hear your motion, Counsel.
Thank you -- Thank you, Your Honor.
Well, it's my motion.
I believe that's correct, the Court

has dismissed and it's a Motion for Reconsideration,
so -THE COURT:

Oh, all right.

MR. MARSH:

Thank you.

Go ahead, Counsel.

It's not correctly

entitled a Motion for Reconsideration, it is a Motion,
under Rules 52, 59 and 60, however, to Amend or to
Amend the Judgment and so on.
A quick review of the facts, if I may, Your
Honor.

We filed, on behalf of Development Associates,

a complaint alleging basically a cause of action for
unjust enrichment.

And Mr. Call filed, on behalf of

his client, a Motion to Dismiss, attaching two
documents outside of the complaint to his motion.
The time, as I calculated under Rule, when a
response to his Motion to Dismiss was due from me was
DEPOMAX RRPOPTTW; rwr» /^ni\ m u i o o
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1

April 25th.

2

to that motion.

3

On that day I served on him our response

And I did not recall, until I received the

4

Court's order, whether I had mailed the original to the

5

Court or actually delivered it.

6

checked later, I must have mailed it, because the

7

original did not reach the Court until I believe the

8

29th.

9

As it turns out, as I

I -- It was due on Thursday, the 25th, I

10

mailed it that day apparently, and it reciched the Court

11

in time to be entered in the Court file the next

12

Monday.

13

days late, that is a Friday and Monday.

14

So, by that reckoning, it would have been two

Mr. Call's secretary called me on May 14th and

15

requested an extension of time to file their reply to

16

my -- my memo in opposition until Monday the 20th, and

17

I granted that extension.

18

And it didn't come on the 20th, but on the

19

21st she called again and requested another extension

20

until the 25th of May, which I granted, which is my

21

practice, whatever they need I usually grant.

22

And their response -- their reply, however,

23

was not filed on the 25th, it was actually filed on the

24

30th of May.

25

me.

So it was late, but that didn't bother

lVJLiuxiT age
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On June 14th Mr. Call filed a Notice to Submit
for Decision, indicating that both parties had
requested oral argument in this matter and referencing
all of the documents that had been filed, his motion,
my response and his reply.
On June 2 6th the Court signed a minute entry
decision and order which states, before the Court is
Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated
April 8th, 2002 and Defendant's alternative Motion for
Definite Statement filed May 30, 2002 and submitted on
its June 14, 2002 Notice to Submit for Decision.
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having no
timely opposition being filed and good files appearing,
the Motion to Dismiss is granted.

This constitutes the

order of the Court.
THE COURT:

Counsel, just so we can get right

to the heart of where we're at today, I see this as a
motion on the merits.
I'm not going to hold you to the problem,
that, as a matter of fact, there -- there seem to have
been other incidences where someone is late, and I'll
get -- I'll get submitted to me on no response an
opportunity to rule on it, and I simply do that.
But if it turns out there's -- that there are
a couple of days delay and everybody has filed their
TYPPrVMT A V
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items, I routinely jiList vacate that and hear the matter
on the merits.

And so that's where we're at today.

MR. MARSH:

Okay.

THE COURT:

I'm not going to hold you to the

I'm --

fact that you were a couple days late, it certainly
isn't something that I think the other side is seeking
to take advantage of

I'm willing to just hear this

matter on its merits •
MR. MARSH:

I was going to suggest that if

that's the Court position this becomes -- or rather it
becomes more complex than it would if it was simply a
dismissal for a two day untimely filing.

That would

make this a very simple matter.
THE COURT:

It would.

And if you're prepared

to proceed on the merits, the Court is as well.

On the

other hand, if you - - if you are unprepared and just
want to set this again, it's up to you, Mr. Marsh.
MR. MARSH:

On the merits, are you speaking of

the merits on our Motion to Dismiss?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. MARSH:

On their Motion to Dismiss?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. MARSH:

That was not noticed for today,

and I did not submit courtesy copies of those documents
1

to the Court, nor did I actually prepare for that
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motion, I was simply prepared to address our motion to
set that aside.
THE COURT:

All right

I don't even think

you're opposing that; are you, Counsel?
MR. CALL:

We had opp osed it, and we did

submit courtesy copies on the merits, and I -- I -- I
do think that this was -- the substance of the issues
were addressed in the memorandum in opposition to
Motion to Vacate.
We addressed - - W e stated in our opposition to
his Motion to Vacate that we weren't objecting to any
of the timeliness issues, but that we address
specifically the merits of the Court's ruling.
So I guess it would be my position that the
merits are before the Court today, because that was -the only response that we made to his motion was we
agreed everything is timely, but we -- we agreed that
the Court can look at the merits and that there's no
basis for a claim.
THE COURT:

Well, is it -- there has been this

issue, and, frankly, I wanted to recognize that I
understand Mr. Marsh's position here, and if you would
be more comfortable rescheduling, fine, if you want to
go to the merits, I'm prepared and I think Counsel is.
MR. MARSH:
TX"IT»Tfc^V^ K M "mr

Well, I believe I can ao tc the
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1

merits of the motion, in which case that would be Mr.

2

Call's motion, and he should address it first I

3

suppose.

4

MR. CALL:

5

THE COURT:

6
7

All right.
That's fine.

But, again, it's

really your decision, Mr. Marsh.
MR. MARSH:

Well, I appreciate that, and does

8

that clarify things for me, and it means I have merits

9

to discuss and not -- not the timeliness issue.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. CALL:

All right.
Giving a little factual background

12

I think is appropriate.

13

Plaintiff, Development Associates, has filed against

14

the Peadens.

15

This is a lawsuit that the

The Peadens owned six lots in a development, a

16

rather large development in Riverton City.

Originally,

17

the developer was a company by the name of Bagley

18

Development.

19

Bagley had gone to Riverton City, had

20

undertaken this development, had posted the appropriate

21

bond to comply with the development process, and in

22

that process sold six lots to the Peadens.

23

After the lots were sold, the developer,

24

Bagley, apparently became in financial woes and

25

borrowed some money in order to tender the property
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1

taxes owing on these hundreds of lots to the County.
Money was borrowed from Mortgage Investment,

2
3

Inc., and, thereafter, Bagley defaulted on the money

4

that it borrowed to pay the taxes.

•5

went into foreclosure and was purchased by the lender,

6

And the property

Mortgage Investment, Inc.
Thereafter, the property was conveyed to the

7
8

Plaintiff in this action, Development Associates.

For

9

whatever reason, the bond that had been pledged for the

10

development was lost or became unenforceable, and so

11

this development remained in its state at that period

12

of time.

13

Sometime thereafter, after Development

14

Associates purchased this property, which we believe

15

was for a very nominal sum, there were some

16

conversations that occurred between the President of

17

the company and the Peadens.

18

And the President of Development Associates,

19

as represented in his affidavit, indicated that he had

20

contacted many of the lot owners and had inquired

21

whether they were willing to immediately assist with

22

the development cost that the Plaintiff wanted to

23

undertake in its own designs and fashions.

24

for approximately eight different lot owners, some of

25 1

them agreed to participate to a certain extent.

And except
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The Peadens indicated that no, this isn't a
good time for us, we're not interested in developing
the lots immediately, we weren't required to do that,
we're holding these lots for our own purpose, and made
it clear that they were not willing to participate with
the developer in making further developments to the
development itself.
After that occurred, the Plaintiff attempted
to move forward with some development and Riverton City
explained to them, you can't do that, we're not going
to let you come in here.
And the Plaintiff, I believe the record
reflects, owns approximately 400 of the 556 lots, went
to Riverton City attempting to get building permits and
other permits to move forward with the development of
their lots.
Riverton City responded and said, no, you
can't do that, you can't do that, we're not going to
allow you to move forward on a partial basis, you're
going to have to make these improvements in order to
move forward.
The Plaintiff, obviously, because in acquiring
this property in a foreclosure type method, had
intended to move forward at that time, knew the
25 1 circumstances when it got involved with the property;
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went forward with some development of the property, and
dealt with Riverton City in order to obtain the
necessary permits.
In obtaining the permits, the Plaintiff
proceeded to make improvements on the development.
After many of the improvements had been made, and there
are three primary plats that were involved, three of
Mr. Peaden's lots were in Plat B, three were in Plat C.
They undertook Plat -- the development of Plat
B first, made some improvements to that plat, and then
also undertook some heavier development in Plat C.

In

1993, before the developments occurred, Mr. Peaden had
sold one of his lots or conveyed one of his lots to his
son.

So, long before the developments occurred, he

only then held five lots, three in Plat B and two in
Plat C.
The Plaintiff moved forward with the
development, Your Honor, and after the improvements
were substantially completed in Plat B, the Plaintiff
then went to the County Recorder and filed a formal
Notice of Claim -- or Notice of Interest, on all of the
Peaden's property.
The Notice of Interest, which is attached as
Exhibit B, states, that the undersigned, Development
Associates, hereby claims and asserts an interest in
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1

subject property pursuant to their improvements and

2

developments, which benefit the following described

3

property.

4

And they proceed to list all of the lots in

5

the three plats.

6

County Recorder on January the 10th, 1997.

7

and we've attached for the Court a copy of that, and I

8

think it's unambiguous that that is a present claim

9

that has been asserted, or a Notice of Interest that

10
11

That was recorded with the Salt Lake
We believe,

has been asserted with respect to that property.
It is our position, Your Honor, that that

12

claim constituted the triggering point for the statutes

13

of limitations with respect to the claims that have

14

been asserted by Development Associates.

15

In its complaint, Development Associates

16

asserts that it is entitled to recover from the Peadens

17

primarily on two claims for relief; one, that there

18

must have been an implied contract between the parties

19

that the Peadens would pay for a portion of the

20

development, thus, an implied in contract claim --

21

implied in fact claim, even though it's undisputed

22

between the parties that there -- that there was no

23

written agreement or oral agreement between the

24

parties, there is a claim stated in the complaint that

25 1

there was an implied in fact contract, which led up tc

I
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the filing of the Notice of Claim that was filed

m

January of 1997.
The second claim for re lief is that the
Plaintiff is asserting that it has conveyed an unjust
enrichment upon the Defendants, because it undertook to
do development work not on their proper ties
specifically, though there were some stubs that were
put on their lots, we're talking about improvements
that are made to the development , and that is the
sewer, the water, the fire, the grading of the roads
and what have you.
With respect to both of those claims, Your
Honor, we have asserted that they are both barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.
Title 78, Section -- Chapter 12, Section 25
states that an action to be brought upon a contract
that is not founded in writing or brought anothei

claim

that's based upon an oral assertion, must be brought
within four years.
In this circumstance the claim that was
asserted was that the parties have been unjustly
enriched.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the

unjust enrichment claim is a four year claim governed
by that applicable statute of limitations.
m

The action

this case was not filed until March of this vear.
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Thus, the claim that was asserted, which was
filed in January of 1997, was more than five years old
before the action in this case was brought.

Thus, it's

the P eaden's position, without even reaching the
subst ance of the claim itself, that it is barred by the
statute of limitations.
Secondly, with respect to the lot --' the
improvements that were made in Lots 379 and 555, which
were the two lots in Plat C, we are also asserting that
those are barred by the statute of limitations, because
those lots were also included in the formal claim that
was asserted and recorded with the County Recorder.
Again, the argument is, Your Honor, that if
there is a significant claim that exists, such that the
Plaintiffs were -- the Plaintiff was entitled to file
such a claim with the County Recorder, then surely its
claim would have accrued at that time.
It's undisputed that the Peadens have never
made any payments to the Plaintiff under any sort of
contract or under any sort of claim in equity.

They

have always rejected and refuted any sort of assertion
that they were obligated to make any such payment.
As such, if the Plaintiff was seeking to sue
in equity or on an implied in fact contract, it must

1 have done so before January 10th of 2001.
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1

Indeed, even if we admit that there is an

2

implied in fact contract that existed before the claim

3

was filed with the County Recorder, thereby justifying

4

the filing of the claim, that would also establish a

5

triggering date before January 10th, 1997, thereby

6

requiring any cause of action to be brought on or

7

before January 10th of the year 2001.

8
9

Again, the complaint that was filed in this
action by the Plaintiff wasn't filed not in January of

10

2001, nor in January of 2002, but in March of 2002.

11

And, therefore, any claim, based upon an implied in

12

fact contract, is also barred by the statute of

13

limitations.

14

In the original complaint that was filed, it

15

was suggested that there were some basis for an implied

16

in fact contract, that the Peadens had implied that

17

they would make payment for some of these improvements.

18

However, later on the President of the

19

company, Mr. Steve Young, filed his sworn affidavit.

20

And in that sworn affidavit, he makes it absolutely

21

clear that there was no such agreement.

22

He states, in paragraph 6 of his affidavit,

23

that -- and I'd like to read this, if I could,

24

"Riverton City required us to install improvements in

25

the entire subdivisions to th^ir mv-rem*-

,-.+-^-*3-~-= -
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opposed to the standards in place when the subdivision
was approved and recorded.
Before doing so, we tried to contact all of
the owners of the other lots to either purchase their
lots or obtain their agreements to participate in the
costs of the improvements.
All of the other owners, either before or
after the improvements were completed, acknowledged the
benefit to them of the improvements and agreed either
to sell their lots or to participate in the cause on a
prorata basis, except for the owners of the eight lots,
including those owned by Defendant Peaden."

So he

clarifies that they never agreed to such a
circumstance.
Because of that, we don't believe that there
are even facts that would sustain an implied in fact
contract even had the statute of limitations not run on
January 10th, 1997.
And we do that, not based upon Mr. Peaden's
affidavit, which, if called to testify, would testify
as Mr. Young has testified, that they had no agreement
or understanding between them with respect to that.
In fact, Mr. Peaden expressly rejected the
suggestion that he participate.

Mr. Peaden was

1 somewhat offended, Your Honor, that someone would come
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to him and say, you either sell your lot to us for
$3,000 or we're going to make the improvements and sue
you.
That doesn't seem appropriate.

It seems to me

that if you buy a lot and you hold it as an investment,
that you shouldn't be held at ransom to conform with
the demands of a majority lot owner simply because he
has a separate timetable and desires to make his
improvements before yours are made.
As this Court knows, there is a statutory
scheme set forth in Title 38 that sets forth a matter
in which a person or a company that makes improvements
to real property may assert a claim.
It's the mechanic's lien statute, it deals
with the rights of owners or subcontractors who improve
property, it sets out a specific manner in which a
notice of lien is recorded with the County Recorder, it
sets forth specific statutes of limitations and rights
of the property owner and the subcontractor that
provides those benefits.
That is the remedy that should be followed if
a subcontractor or a person conveying a benefit to land
believes that he is entitled to a lien for some amount
must satisfy that statute.
The facts are undisputed that nothing was done
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with respect to that statute, there was no notice of
lien filed under Title 38, there has been no
subcontractor's lien, there have been none of the
notices filed or served, as required by that statute.
There was no foreclosure action brought under that
subchapter for closure within the one year period, as
required by that section.

And that's undisputed.

We're not to suggest that there may not be a remedy
in certain circumstances for subcontractors, because
that happens frequently, and I'm sure the Court has
addressed some of those claims.

There was no such

claim brought under Title 38, and there is no basis for
it.
Finally, with respect to the claim of unjust
enrichment, even if the statute of limitations had not
run on all of these claims, Your Honor, the law appears
rather clear in Utah that a claim of unjust enrichment
does not exist when a party conveys an indirect benefit
on a neighbor.
And, if I may approach.

Your Honor, the Utah

Supreme Court has adopted the restitution -- or the
restatement of restitution in Utah with respect to
causes of action and equity, which would include a
claim for unjust enrichment.
Part of that restitution that's been adopted

Mum-rage
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by the Supreme Court is Section 106.

It addressed --

Long before any of us were upon this earth, they
addressed this document when they codified the doctrine
of restatement of restitution.
And they wanted to make it clear that even
though in certain circumstances a party could recover a
claim for unjust enrichment, that under no circumstance
would a party be able to use that to coerce a third
party who refuses to participate in some cost to be
sued under that doctrine.
Section 106 reads; a person, who incidentally
to the performance of his own duty, or to the
protection or the improvement of his own things, has
conferred a benefit upon another, is not, thereby,
entitled to contribution.
Then it comes down and makes it absolutely
clear, and makes three illustrations.

Illustration

one, A, the owner of land on a riverbank, reasonably
fearing immediate inundation, requests his neighbor, B,
to join in the building of a dike, which will preserve
the land of both.

B refuses.

A builds the dike, which saves both pieces of
land from being flooded.
contribution from B.

Result:

A is not entitled to

Example two, A and B are

adjoining landowners whose lines have been flooded by
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separate seepage from a nearby swamp.

1
2

A reques ts B to join him in draining the

3

swamp, B refuses.

4

both lines.

5

contribution from B.

6

except that C had contracted to keep water out of A's

7

mine, and he drains the mine - - o r drains the swamp in

8

performance of his duty to A.

9

entitled to contr ibution from B.

10

A drains the swamp, thereby drying

Resu It:

He is not entitled to
Same facts as illustration two,

Result:

C is not

The same result occurs here, Your Honor.

We

11

have a party who purchased through a foreclosure

12

process 400 of some 500 lots.

13

of its ownership, the City required that the Plaintiff

14

undertake certain development, not for the Defendants,

15

but for their own efforts.

Because of the quantity

In performing those duties, the Defendants

16
17

have received an incidental benefit.

And it didn't

18

agree to pay for those, it didn't mislead the Plaintiff

19

in any way.
And, as a result, the Plaintiff has no right

20
21

or claim in unjus t enrichment.

It's benefits were --

22

It's benefits were beneficial.

And the Plaintiff knew

23

that they had rej ected any suggestion that they would

24

pay or contribute to those benefits before the
1

^rNnrnvQmDni" Q
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pver made.
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1

Based upon that, Your Honor, we have moved the

2

Court to dismiss the action that has been brought

3

against the Peadens on grounds that it's barred by the

4

statute of limitations, that there are no facts

5

(inaudible) implied in that contract, if there were,

6

they were barred by the statute of limitations, that

7

there is no claim in equity against the Peadens under

8

these circumstances.

9

And, finally, Your Honor, I think you're well

10

aware that in Courts of equity a party may never

11

approach a Court and ask for equitable unjust

12

enrichment or some other equitable claim unless they

13

have clean hands.

14

And in this case the Plaintiff went in and

15

intentionally filed a Notice of Interest with the

16

County Recorder, placing (inaudible) or a lien upon all

17

of our property.

18

And then later testifying, in his sworn

19

affidavit, Mr. Young says, oh, we hadn't done anything

20

at that time.

21

as to bring them within the four year statute.

22

Our improvements were made in 1998, such

I assert to the Court that even if that were

23

true, and even if the improvements were not made until

24

1998, the fact that the Plaintiff went in and

25

intentionally filed that Nntirp O-F m ^-; ~

_.--.--•— -
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1

present assertion of a claim against the Peaden's

2

property, knowing that it was false, is not clean

3

hands, and, as such, the Plaintiff has no standing or

4

right at thi s point to assert a claim in equity.

5

with that, Your Hono r, we would pray the Court to

6

dismiss the action.

7

THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel.

8

MR. MARSH:

I'm not quite sure how to begin

with that.

9

And

Mr. Marsh.

But, just to respond to that last point,

10

Mr. Call is claiming that Development Associates has no

11

clean hands in this situation.
The Court needs to understand that what

12
13

Development Associates did here, and not -- that wasn't

14

voluntarily, but because they were forced to by Salt

15

Lake County and the City of Riverton.

16

to develop the lots which they owned.

They brought it

17

The County and the City of Riverton required

18

them not to develop their own lots, but to put in the

19

improvements that would improve all of the lots in all

20

three of tho se subdivisions, 556 lots total, and 100 to

21

150 of those lots thkey did not own.

22

The re is inL the file, Your Honor, a copy of

23

Mr. Young's affidavi t, which has a copy of the plats

24

coverage, anLd we' ve marked in yellow there the ones
1

t-hat wprc owned, andI vou

can see there's a checkerboard
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1
2

pattern.
It was impossible to go in and improve just

3

the lots that are owned by Development Associates

4

without also improving the neighboring lots, absolutely

5

impossible.

6

In the process of improving those lots, the

7

cost per lot turned out to be somewhere between $13,000

8

and $17,000 per lot, depending on the location.

9

a substantial sum of money that was expended in

10
11

That's

improving lots that Development Associates did not own.
The value of those lots before Development

12

Associates stepped in was approximately $500 per lot,

13

and that could be established by sales of those lots at

14

that point in time.

15

over $50,000 per lot, only because of the improvements

16

that Development Associates put in.

The value of those lots today is

17

To suggest that they don't have clean hands

18

after having handed Mr. Peaden a value of $45,000 to

19

$50,000 per lot, I think is somewhat ridiculous.

20
21
22

And let me go back and talk a little about the
history -THE COURT:

Well, if I understand his

23

argument, isn't the -- isn't this conferred benefit,

24

but the argument is that you filed a Notice of Claim

25

before you had any -- had actually r-n-nfo^->-o^ ^,.
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benefit at all, whatever your legal position is on the
benefit?
MR. MARSH:

And that's the harm that we did

THE COURT:

If I understood him right.

MR. MARSH:

If that's what he's claiming, he

here?

has not shown any harm resulting from the filing of
that Notice of Interest.

And let me give a little

history on that too, if I may.
And a lot of this history, you know, may be of
interest of the Court and may be helpful to the Court,
although it doesn't appear in the complaint, and, of
course, in our Motion to Dismiss, it is the facts
asserted in the complaint which are taken for truth.
Development Associates did not foreclose on these
lots, they actually purchased these lots from somebody
else and paid a substantial sum for them.

They

initially went to Salt Lake County -- Well, let me back
up.
Owners of these lots, which have not been
developed, have often gone to Salt Lake County and
says, we want to get building permits.

The County

says, sorry, we can't help you, there's nothing we can
do, there's no improvements out there, we will not let
1 vou build.
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1

Well, how do we solve this problem?

The

2

County and staff people said, we don't know.

3

Development Associates came in and said, there are 550

4

lots out there that people own, there must be a way to

5

solve this problem.

6

Initially, they went to the County and said,

7

can we form a special improvement district that would

8

include all of these lots, have that district put in

9

all of the improvements, and then have that district

10

assess each lot for the prorata cost of those

11

improvements.

12

Therefore, each owner would have had to pay,

13

not necessarily in cash, but over -- assessments

14

probably over a ten year period of time the cost of

15

those improvements to reimburse the special improvement

16

district.

17

The County went through a process for over a

18

year trying to set that up, and it ultimately was

19

determined not feasible, because the County wouldn't

20

approve it without some pledging of other assets by

21

Development Associates, and it was ultimately

22

determined the cost to do that through the County would

23

be more than it could be done privately.

24

So Development Associates decided, well, we

Page 2 6
Salt Lake County.

The lots, by the way, were in Salt

Lake County at that point in time.

And the County

said , we will allow you to go ahead and improve those
lots , but you must improve every one.
At that point in time, Riverton City stepped
in, and because of the nearness of these lots to
Riverton City, they wanted to annex this property into
Riverton City, and that happened, and so Riverton City
took over the process from Salt Lake County.
And Riverton City also said, you must improve
all of the lots, and not just to the standards that
were in place at the time these lots were first
approved back in 1980, but to our current standards,
whic h increased the cost per lot that had to be
expended to improve these lots.
At that point in time, Development Associates
then approached the owners of all the other lots with
the proposal that we're willing to buy your lot, we
will agree with you -- or have you agree with us to
shar e some of these expenses, or let's find some other
way to make it work.
And every other lot owner out of that 100 to
150 that were not owned by Development Associates,
ultimately agreed to that solution, and. either sold the

1 lots to Development Associates or they agreed to
npjpnMAY ttPTPfwrrwr^ ixir1 ^ n n ^9£-i ICE
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participate in the costs.
And I should say there was a prior lawsuit
against one of those owners, and after that lawsuit was
filed, some 30 or 40 other lot owners joined in that
suit, and we ended up settling that suit by accepting
payment from those other owners for a portion of their
costs of development.
We're down to the part where Mr. Peaden is the
only one -- I shouldn't say that.

He had one lot that

he conveyed to a son, and that son participated in that
settlement.

And so, in that sense, he was a part of

that settlement.

These few lots he held out of that

settlement, and I'm not sure why.
The -- It is true that Mr. Peaden did not
agree up front to pay the cost -- his share of the
cost, but it is true that when he was contacted he
acknowledged the need for those improvements to be put
in, he knew that his lot was essentially worthless
without them, and he encouraged Development Associates
to proceed with those improvements.
Now, that's a fact which is in the complaint,
it's in Mr. Young's affidavit, which must be taken as
true for purposes of this motion.

And that's all that

is required for unjust enrichment in the state of Utah.
He knows the benefit that is beincr conferred on him,
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1

and he encourages them to proceed, then he is subject

2 I

to a claim for unjust enrichment.

3

Development Associates went ahead, expended

4

literally millions of dollars improving the lots in

5

Subdivision A, then B, and then C.

6

has got a restatement for his authority, there are

7

numerous cases in the state of Utah which -- which

8

define what constitutes unjust enrichment.

9

And while Mr. Call

And there are some cases in the Court of

10

Appeals which go into some detail about what

11

constitutes unjust enrichment.

12

In fact, the case of Davies vs. Olson goes

13

into great detail and says that there are two branches,

14

and one of those branches, which they refer to as quasi

15

contract, which, by the way, is different from implied

16

contract, quasi contract -- the elements of a quasi

17

contract the Court of Appeals says is, a contract

18

implied in law are, the Defendant receive the benefit,

19

which is true in this case, two, an appreciation or

20

knowledge by the Defendant of that benefit, which is

21

true in this case, he knows that his lot was improved

22

and the value was increased by $45,000 or more, and,

23

three, under the circumstances it would make it unjust

24

for the Defendant to retain the benefit without paying

25

for it.
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THE COURT:

Isn't there another element that

2 I

the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to perform the

3 I

work?
MR. MARSH:

In -- In this Davis vs. Olson

5 I

case, the Court of Appeals states, there are two

6

branches of this area of the law called

7

The first credential is the one I just referred to,

8

which they call a quasi contract.

(inaudible).

9

In the second branch, they say that is a

10

contract implied in fact as opposed to a contract

11

implied in law.

12

all stated on page 6 by way of our Memorandum in

13

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and that will be

14

in the file and not a courtesy copy.

15

And the elements there -- these are

But that -- that branch of

(inaudible) has

16

elements that are, one, the Defendant requested the

17

Plaintiff to perform the work, and I think that's what

18

the Court has referenced here, two, the Plaintiff

19

expected the Defendant to compensate him or her for

20

those services, and, three, the Defendant knew or

21

should have kno wn that the Plaintiff

22

compensation.

expected

23

THE COURT:

All right.

24

MR. MARSH:

So, there are two different

25 I branches and one of them recruires of the Defendant s
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1

request that the other branch does not require.

2

Now, I should point out that the Utah Supreme

3

Court, both before and after the Davies vs. Olson case

4

in 1987, has stated the elements of (inaudible)

5

somewhat differently.
In fact, in the most recent case, Jeffs vs.

6
7

Stubbs, a 1988 case -- 1990 case, I'm sorry, and this

8

is referred to on page 7 of our memo, the Court stated,

9

first the facts underlined in an unjust enrichment

10

claim are often complex and vary greatly from case to

11

case.

12

Indeed, by it's very nature, the unjust

13

enrichment doctrine developed to handle fact situations

14

that did not fit within a particular legal standard,

15

but which, nonetheless, merited judicial intervention.

16

They go on to state that the remedy of

17

restitution is not confined to any particu].ar

18

circumstance or set of f acts, it is rather a flexible,

19

equitable remedy available whenever the Court finds

20

that the Defendant, upon the circumstances of the case,

21

is obliged, by the ties of natural justice and equity,

22

to make compensation for benefits received.

23

In other words, the Utah Supreme Cou rt is

24

staying with a very flexible, unfixed standar d in

25 1

unjust enrichment

situat ions

meaning that we don't
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have to comply necessarily with all of those elements
set forth in the Court of Appeals decision.
They say a Court need not find that the
Defendant intended to compensate the Plaintiff for the
services rendered, only that the Plaintiff intended
that the Defendant be a party to make compensation.
This is because the duty to compensate for unjust
enrichment is an obligation implied by law without
reference to the intention of the parties, it's implied
by law.
What is important is that it be shown that it
was not intended or expected that the service be
rendered for benefit conferred gratuitously, and that
the benefit was not conferred officiously.
And then it goes on to say what is meant by
gratuitously and officiousness.

Officiousness means

interference in the affairs of another not justified by
the circumstances under which the interference takes
place.
I suggest that Mr. Peaden knew that these
improvements had to be done and he encouraged the
Development Associates people to go ahead, that that
was not officiousness for them to proceed to develop
those lots and improve his lot along with the rest of
the lots in those subdivisions.
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THE COURT:

1

You've alleged that in the

2

complaint, but is there any affidavit to sustain that

3

argument?

4

MR. MARSH:

The fact that he --

5

THE COURT:

He encouraged them to do it?

6

MR. MARSH:

Yes.

7

THE COURT:

What paragraph?

8

MR. MARSH:

Let me find it.

Mr. Young's affidavit --

And I should

point out the fact that it's in with the claim, and

9
10

under

(inaud.ible), it's supposed to be taken as true.

11

But Mr. Young's aff idavit, nevertheless, states -THE COURT:

12

I think -- I think you're both

13

relying on matters outside of the pleadings, so it

14

seems to me 1this really becomes a Motion for Summary

15

Judgment.
MR. MARSH:

16

Well, with respect to that item,

17

I'm relying <on the allegation in the complaint,

18

paragraph seven, which says, Defendant acknowledged the

19

need to install sue,h improvements, and that such

20

improvements would benefit him and increase the value

21

of the lots <Dwned by him, and encouraged and requested

22

Plaintiff to proceeid with the installation of such

23

improvements , there\ our Motion to Dismiss must be taken

24

as true.

25

I

MR.

CALL:

If I could ]ust interrupt

I don'::
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1

think that's what that paragraph says, I think the

2

quote is misread.

3

MR. MARSH:

4

MR. CALL:

The quote
Doing so and encouraged, there's no

request in that par agraph.

5
6

MR. MARSH:

7

MR. CALL :

8

MR. MARSH:

I didn't say request.
Said encouraged and requested.
I'm reading from paragraph seven,

which one are you reading from?

9

MR. CALL :

10

I'm reading paragraph seven

of his

affidavit that you read.

11

MR. MARSH:

12

I'm -- I'm

reading the complaint,

I'm sorry.

13
14

MR. CALL:

15

Oh, I thought you were citing his

affidavit.
MR. MARSH:

16

I'm reading the complaint, because

17

that is what must b e taken as the truth for purposes of

18

the motion itself.
THE COURT:

19

I'm wondering if --- if you file an

20

affidavit wh.ich is inconsistent with your complaint in

21

response to ian affi davit, I'm

22

upon that complaint or if I'm forced to rely upon your

23

own affidavit.

24
25

1

wondering if I can rely

MR. MARSH:

What --

THE COURT:

Paragraph seven in the affidavit
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1

reads, Mr. Peaden was also contacted and acknowledged

2

the need to install such improvements and the benefit

3

to hLim by doing so, and encouraged us to proceed with

4

the installation of such improvements.

5

affi davit; right?

That's your

6

MR. MARSH:

That's --

7

THE COURT:

That's --

8

MR. MARSH:

-- Mr. Young's affidavit, but I

9
10
11

don' t believe that's inconsistent with what I just read
from the complaint.
If I may read that again, Defendant

12

acknowledged the need to install such improvements, and

13

that. such improvements would benefit him and increase

14

the value of the lots owned by him, and encouraged --

15

and it does say requested - - but that he did encourage

16

Plaintiff to proceed.

17

So the requested is the only difference in the

18

affi.davit and -- and the complaint.

19

that is that Development Associates was not

20

(inaudible), because they did not interfere in his

21

affairs if they proceeded to do something which he

22

acknowledged would be of benefit to them, which he

23

encouraged them to go ahead and do because he knew it

24

would benefit him.

25

The bottom line of

And I was going to read from the Jeffs vs.
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Stubbs case the definition of gratuitously.

It says,

one renders services gratuitously if at the time they
were rendered there was no expectation of a return
benefit, compensation or consideration.

Development

Associates certainly expected to be compensated for the
benefit they were conferring upon Mr. Peaden.
Now, if I could jump to Mr. Call's claim of
why the statute of limitation applies, because that's
really the only issue before the Court, his Motion to
Dismiss, because he said the statute of limitations had
expired.
Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense which you assert in your answer,
and then you get into discovery and determine whether
or not there's some facts that support that.
Rather, he attached to his motion two
documents, which are matters outside the complaint,
one, the Notice of Interest, which was recorded, and,
second, the report from the City of Riverton.
The report from the City of Riverton applied
only to Plat B, had no reference to anything in Plat C,
so would not have any effect with respect to those
lots.

Furthermore, it stated expressly that the

improvements were not complete at the time that report
was issued.
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In fact, Mr. Young's affidavit goes on to

1
2

state the improvements were installed long after that

3

date

4

been installed, because they need to be completed under

5

the bond filed with the City of Riverton.

And, in fact, some improvements have not yet

6

Notice of Interest, upon which Mr. Call relies

7

most heavily, was filed at the time the improvements in

8

Plat A were installed, and -- and they did record it

9

against the lots in Plats A, B and C, even though they

10
11

have not yet commenced the improvements in B and C.
Nowhere in that notice does it give any date as to

12

when improvements were installed or completed.

13

Mr. Call to rely upon that notice as the document which

14

says the statute of limitations began to run on this

15

date I think is totally improper.

16

And for

That's why Mr. Young filed his affidavit

17

saying, we were installing improvements m

18

long after that notice of interest was filed.

19

notice wasn't filed to state when -- the dates when

20

improvements were installed, it was simply to put other

21

owners on notice that they were proceeding to do work

22

with in that subdivision.

23

those plats
That

Mr. Call also argued that the mechanic's lien

24

statute hasn't been complied with.

We have made no

25

claim under the mechanic's lien statute, haven' r
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attempted to make any claiiri under that statute.
We are simply asserting that this is a matter
of unjust enrichment which requires one who has
received a benefit, knew about the benefit and, under
circumstances where equity requires that he pay for
that benefit, to do so.
The elements of unjust enrichment are that
simple.

He's acknowledged the benefit to him, he knows

he has lots that are worth $5 0,0 00 today, he can go
sell them for that amount.
THE COURT:

Well, what if -- if a person owns

some lots that are there being held for investment and
a developer comes in and decides, well, I'm going to
develop all this, and some governmental authority tells
the developer he has to do certain things in order to
do the development, and so the developer, with that
choice, decides to proceed, what is it that -- where's
the equity that requires this person holding it for
investment to accept whatever this developer decides is
the developer's time table on this thing?

Why is there

any equity at all in that?
Your developer didn't do it to confer a
benefit on him, he did it to confer a benefit on
himself, it was a cost of doing business.

If he -- If

he had decided it was not in his interest to do ±z,

Mr.
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Peaden would have been -- his interest would have been
2

a matte r of complete and total indifference to him.

3

MR. MARSH:

Well, the Court states that, but

4

that si mply is not true.

5

up and say, I did not want a lot that I could bui Id a

6

home on , I simply wanted a little 150 by 50 foot lot

7

that I could put a cow on or grow some vegetables on,

8

you know, that would be one matter.

9

If Mr. Peaden were to s tand

He bought those as residential

subdivision

10

lots.

11

expecte d that improvements would be put on those lots

12

so that he would have a buildable lot.

13

happen.

14

And when he bought them back in 1980 or '82, he

That didn ' t

Development Associates comes along years later
He knows that he ' s

15

and cures that problem for him.

16

being b enefitted, he doesn't want to sit and say, I

17

want to keep these as agricultural lots for the r est of

18

my life , that simply was not in his mind at all, he

19

wanted subdivision lots.

20

He has come forward now to try and avoid

21

payment of this because he knows he can sell them for

22

$50,000 as residential lots.

23

for anywhere near that without the improvements that

24

have been installed for his benefit.

25

He could not sell them

Development Associates didn't want to do than ,
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they were forced by the City of Riverton to do it, or
you can't develop your lots, because they were tired of
having people like Mr. Peaden come to them and say, I
want a building permit, and having to say, no, you
can't do it because there are no improvements there.
Development Associates cured the problem for all
of these people, including Mr. Peaden.

It just doesn't

make sense to say that they stepped in and forced him
to take a developed lot when that's what he wanted from
the very first day he bought the lot.

They've

given him what he wanted, they've done what he knew had
to be done, they've done what he encouraged them to do,
because he knew that that would benefit him.

Now, he

simply doesn't want to pay for that benefit.
All we're asking for is that he does, like all
of the other lot owners out there who have received
that benefit, that he chip in and pay his share.
That's not inequitable.
he do that.

In fact, equity requires that

That's simply all we're asking, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Thank you, Counsel.

I know you're running late on time,

and I will make this quick, Your Honor.
unequivocable.

Mr. Call.

It is

Based on the numbers that Mr. Marsh has

presented to the Court, it would appear to me that
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1

Development Associates has made $14,000,000.

2

If they went in there and did the developments

3

on these lots for $15,000 a lot and they own 400 of

4

those lots and they're now worth $50,000 a piece, then

5

they've had over $14,000 -- or $14,000,000 in profit.

6

As Counsel indicated to the Court, which we

7

think is dispositive in part, and one our alternative

8

theories is that the improvements could not be made

9

without making the improvements.

10

That is -- That is what an indirect benefit

11

is.

12

I have here, where what happened in that case, the

13

builder came in and built four duplexes on a piece of

14

property owned by the owner, and their land sale - - o r

15

that the agreement between them failed, and he turned

16

and sued the owner and said, well, gee, you've got to

17

give me something for all this work that I've done to

18

your property.

19

It isn't a situation like Davies vs. Olson, which

That's a completely different scenario.

In our circumstance we have an indirect

20

benefit, which has been acknowledged, that they did it

21

only because the City required them to do it, and they

22

did it for their own interest.

23

There's no question that in a restatement of

24

restitution that I provided to the Court it makes it

25

clear that -- it savs m

example one, it says, E

Multi-Page™
Page 4 1 |
1 I refuses to pay -- or B refuses, A builds a dike and
2
3

saves both pieces of land from being flooded.
The second one is it saved the other property

4

from being drained.

So the mere fact that there's a

5

benefit conferred upon the Peadens isn't the test, the

6

test is was did they -- were they unjustly enriched to

7

the detriment of the Plaintiff, and that's just simply

8 I not the case.
The Plaintiff did what -- what it chose to do
10 I for its own benefit, and it's benefitted tremendously
11

from that.

12

I think it would be a terrible policy for the

13

Court to suggest that if someone in a development or a

14

neighborhood makes some improvement to a road or to

15

some property that they feel improves the neighbor's

16

land, that somehow that -- that will sustain a cause of

17

action upon that neighbor because he has received some

18

implied benefit.

19

These benefits that have been asserted to the

20

Court aren't benefits that went on their ground, these

21

are benefits that went in the development.

22

are other matters that -- benefits that Development

23

Associates received in dealing with the City.

24
25

And there

It's my understanding that they were given
property in other thincrs .

They've Hnno vpn? woi ^ •;-n
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1

this development.

2

Honor, the fact of the matter is is that the statute of

3

limitations has run on that.

4

But, notwithstanding that, Your

The claim -- Utah has a wrongful -- a wrongful

5

lien statute, and it states that you may not file

6

wrongful lien means any document that purports to

7

create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in

8

certain real property at the time it is recorded or

9

filed that is not expressly authorized by this chapter,

10

referring to Title 38, or authorized or contained in an

11

order or judgment of a court of competent

12

in the state, or signed by or authorized pursuant to a

13

document signed by the owner of the property.

14

--a

jurisdiction

The Plaintiff didn't have a judgment that

15

authorized the recording of such a notice of interest

16

or lien, he didn't do it based on any statutory

17

provision that he' s referred to anywhere, because there

18

is none, that he's acknowledged that they didn't comply

19

with Title 38, which is the only section they could

20

have filed such a notice of interest or lien on the

21

property under, and it's undisputed that they didn't

22

sign any agreement with the Defendants that would have

23

authorized such a finding.

24

title.

25

It was

(inaudible) on the

And this isn't a trial on the merits, we're
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here dismissing the complaint, because the notice of
interest was improperly filed, it was filed in January
of 1997.
The report, that was provided as Exhibit C to
our motion, reflects an improvement report that was
done by the City with respect to the first three lots,
and it was a certified copy and it was certified in
script.
But it states, fire apparatus was installed on
November 12th, 1997, the fire access road installed on
November 12th, 1997, the all curb and gutter is
installed as of November 1st, 1997, road base or
asphalt installed all by November 11th, 1997.
And then underneath it it's script, all roads
are based and most are asphalted, see the following map
for asphalted roads.

And then below it says, sewer

cleared as per Annette 11/7/97.
That document makes it clear that even though
it was recorded - - o r that City report was prepared
nearly eleven months after the notice of interest was
filed, it still reflects that most of this work, with
respect to that plat, was completed before the end of
19 97, not 19 98 .
This action was filed in March of 2002.

As

such, all of that work is well bovnnri i-v«o fnnr ^r^^^
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statute of limitations, even if there were a claim for
unjust enrichment, which there isn't.
With respect to the doctrines of quasi
contract, quasi contract is just a gene ral term that
states that in equity you can recover, if there isn't a
written agreement or an oral agreement, under certain
circumstances, a contract implied in fact is where the
facts indicate that the parties agreed that there would
be a payment, even though there is noth ing in writing.
In this case, the affidavit of Mr. Young, who
is the President of the company, states in paragraph
six -- and I think paragraph six and seven need to be
read together -- he comes in and he say s, we contacted
all of the owners, and we asked them to either sell
them our property or to share in these costs.
And he went on and said that a 11 of them
agreed to either participate or to sell their lots
except for -- and agreed to either sell their lots or
participate in the cost on a prorata ba sis "except for
the owners of eight lots, including tho se owned by
Defendant, Gene Peaden."

He testifies in his own

affidavit that he didn't agree to make those payments.
So I'm hard pressed to believe that any - there c^ould be any factual dispute that the
1 requesjzed

Peadens

that they be made or somehow implied tnat

Multi-Page™
Page 451
they would pay for those improvements when the
President of Plaintiff's company has testified that he
didn't, and certainly he didn't.
He may have said, sure, that will improve the
property, but I'm not willing to do it.

They did it on

their own timetable, they didn't seek his approval with
respect to how they did it, it was their own deal, and
they did it and the statute has now run.
THE COURT:

Well, what they're arguing is that

your client didn't agree to pay, but he encouraged them
to proceed anyway.
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

How do you interpret -Well -What is your argument about -I think in that circumstance, Your

Honor
THE COURT:

I mean six says he said he

wouldn't pay, seven says he encouraged them.
MR. CALL:

Yeah.

Mr. Peaden was also

contacted and acknowledged the need to install the
improvements and the benefit to him by so doing and
encouraged us to proceed with the installation of such
improvements.
He says, they first approached him and said,
will you participate, will you agree to sell us your
lot or pay for any of these expenses?

No, I'm not
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1

willing to do that.

Well, we're going to go ahead with

2

the development.

3

with it, you should -- if you're going to develop your

4

property, we -- go ahead and do it, that's terrific.

And well, good , go ahead, good luck

But the fact of the matter is is that they did it

5
6

for their own benefit.

7

that he had told them that he wasn't going to

8

participate.

9

we're talking about is maybe equ itable estoppel or

10

It was c lear that he had --

And I think, Your Honor, I think what

misrepresentation.
In this circumstance, even if we assume that

11
12

he said, I won't pay, but I encourage you to do it,

13

there's no reasonable reliance.

14

Plaintiff had to do what it had to do, it didn't rely

15

to its detriment, it already has acknowledged that it

16

made the improvements because it had 4 00 lots, and the

17

City, as he reiterated, the City expressly told us that

18

if we didn't do it, we couldn't develop any of our

19

lots.

Why?

Because the

So whether he made such a statement or whether

20
21

he didn't was immaterial, was not relied upon to any

22

detriment of the Plaintiff.
Your Honor, it's clear that lot 380 is well

23
24

outside the ownership of the issue here.

?=;

t-h^rpforp

should be barred clearly.

Any claim,

The first three
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lots were in sub -- Plat B, the records, the affidavit,
2

the report, notice of interest all reflect that that's

3

well beyond the four year statute of limitations.
A cause of action accrues when the Plaintiff

4

knows that he has a claim for relief.

And in this

circumstance the Plaintiff came to the conclusion that
7

it had a claim for relief against the Defendant,

8

Peaden, in January of 1997 when it went down to the

9

County Recorder's Office and said, the undersigned

10

Development Associates hereby claims and asserts an

11

interest in the subject property pursuant to their

12

improvements and developments which benefited the

13

described property.

14

Whatever the status of that development was,

15

it had determined that it had done sufficient work and

16

incurred sufficient contracts or whatever, that it had

17

a right to assert a claim.

18

to assert a claim as of that time, the four year

19

statute of limitations was triggered.

And because it had a right

There's never been a payment, he's always

20
21

refuted payment, and, therefore, even under their

22

theory the four year statute would have run based upon

23

that claim.

24

improvements all be made before the claim is asserted.

25

1

TllP

I don't think it requires that the

13W

qofflpH
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1

relief, that when they arise that you may have

2

continuing torts, you may have all sorts of things that

3

are ongoing, but that doesn't mean that the claim for

4

relief does not arise when it could have been plead.

5

And based on everything that I've heard today, is

6

that the Plaintiff had made some improvements, but not

7

necessarily completed everything, but at least felt

8

that it was in a situation where it could assert a

9

claim, and did, in fact, assert a claim.

10

With respect to the affidavit and the other

11

records that have been submitted, we've cited in our

12

brief, Your Honor, the Standing Associate Students of

13

University decision, which states that the Court may

14

consider outside materials in making its decision.

15

Indeed, the two documents that we attached are both

16

public records.

The one is a -- is a copy of the

17

Notice of Interest, which was recorded with the County,

18

the other is a -- is the report that we've been

19

referring to.

20

And, Your Honor, I will indicate that there's

21

been no objection or dispute as to the authenticity of

22

either of those documents.

23

some dispute that they were inaccurate, that we would

24

have to convert this to a Motion for Summary Judgment

25 1

and mavbe, perhaps, Mr. Young's sworn affidavit does,

I agree that if there was
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in fact convert it to a summary judgment.

But , from

our standpoint, it makes no difference.
We think his affidavit supersedes the
complaint, because he is the person who has the
personal knowledge, he lays it out, he covers the very
facts that are in question, and we think that that is
the controlling document in this circumstance.
But, nevertheless, we still win, Your Honor,
on statute limitations and on the substantive law that
they have failed to state a claim for unjust
enrichment, and, thus, as the Court to dismiss the
action.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. MARSH:

Your Honor, may I address two

issues that were not addressed by us?
THE COURT:

You may.

MR. MARSH:

First of all, Mr. Call's statement

about $14,000,000 profit is totally without ba sis and
totally untrue, and requires his knowledge -- some
knowledge as to what the cost -THE COURT:

I don't think it really g oes to

the merits of the argument.
MR. MARSH:

Okay.

The second issue about the

wrongful lien statute was not raised earlier, that
1

statute provides that if somebody signed a document or
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1

recorded a document which is improper, then you need to

2

give twenty days written notice to that party to remove

3

that -- that document before you can claim any damages

4

whatsoever.

5

That has never been done.

And had they done so, we would have released

6

those lots f rom the effect of that notice of interest.

7

We did so in other cases, there were people who gave us

8

that twenty day notice under the statute.

9

•

So,

under the statute, that simply doesn't

10

apply and di d not cloud his title in such a way that it

11

caused any damage to him whatsoever, because he didn't

12

follow the w rongful lien statute.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CALL:

Do you want to respond?
Yeah.

My rebuttal to that would

15

be, based on that acknowledgement, Your Honor, he's

16

saying, yeah , we filed it wrongfully and we would have

17

removed it i f somebody would have made a written

18

request, is an acknowledgement that it was wrongful.

19

You may not obtain equity with unclean hands.
If they knowingly and intentionally filed a

20
21

wrongful lien, that's wrongful - - (Tape was turned

22

over) -- in a summary type proceeding, much like an

23

eviction proceeding, and expunge an unlawful

24

(inaudible) or notice of interest or something to that.

25 1

Tha t's a process for clearing title, but that

jvcn>r*x* A v- i>r2T>r\j>rrTKirt TKm / e m \ iiV-t
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doesn't mean that you go out and you can record any
sort of instrument against someone else's property, and
that, oh, it's not wrongful unless they challenge it.
That's not true.

The statute allows for the clearing

of titl e.
And if Counsel, what he's indicated is, oh,
yeah, we went out and filed these and they were
wrongfu 1 and we just removed them when anybody made a
demand, sustains our position that they filed it
knowing that it was wrongful when they filed it, and
they're not entitled to any equity as a result of that.
THE COURT:

All right, Counsel.

The Court, in

referri ng to Rule 12b6, refers to the language which
states, to dismiss for (inaudible) claim upon which
relief may be granted on matters outside of -- if on a
motion asserting defense number six to dismiss for
failure of the pleading, state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion
shall b e treated as one (inaudible) judgment and
dispose d of as provided in Rule 56, all parties should
be give the reasonable opportunity to present all
materia Is made pertinent to such a motion, Rule 56.
I think that's where we're at here today on

1 this, because there have been matters that have been
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presented outside the pleadings.

Are there other --

Are there other pleadings that the parties believe
should be presented in order to treat this as a Rule 56
motion?
MR. CALL:
MR. MARSH:

No, Your Honor.
If that's where the Court is going

with this, consider this as a Motion for Summary
Judgment, I think the Court really needs to take a look
at the cases that we cited by the Supreme Court, and
suggest that, first of all, the statute of limitations
is an affirmative defense which is not usually properly
considered on a Motion to Dismiss, and because there
are usually matters of discovery that relate to that.
For example, if this man was out of the state
for any period of time during this four year period of
time, that time period is not included in the statute
of limitations.

Discovery is required to determine

whether that statute is extended because of his absence
from the state.
Now, that's something we cannot get without
discovery.

So I would suggest that discovery is

required before the Court can really make that
conclusion.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
TVEMftn** A V
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Well, do you want to respond?
Yeah, Mr. Peaden hasn't been out of
/ O A 1 \ ' J O C . I 1 QQ
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the state other than maybe a week vacation here and
there.

He has not -- He's been in the state since

1997.
THE COURT:

Well, it seems to me that we have

some aspects of this motion are properly treated as
summary judgment because affidavits have been -- have
come into play.

And I don't think the facts that

under -- underpin a Motion to Dismiss for - - o n statute
of limitation grounds would be included.
What seems to be clear to me are the unjust
enrichment arguments, in which there have been the
affidavit of Steven R. Young and that have been
referenced, and seem to me to be a very much referred
to by both parties.
And I think that perhaps the way the Court
should -- should address the issue is -- is impart a
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of which
matters outside of the scope of the pleadings that have
been addressed, and as matters within this Motion to
Dismiss when there hasn't been any -- any issues
referred to, and I think that that would cover the
statute of limitations.
It is the Court's decision to decide this on
the merits, and to me that is primarily a decision that
1

references the doctrine of unjust enrichment, is to
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grant the motion.
I -- I believe that neither party is really

2
3

much in d ifference as to what the law is, that the

4

standard that was quoted in the brief by Mr. Marsh, and

5

I think there's at least a 1997 case that -- Promax

6

Development vs. Madsen, 943 P2d 243, which -- which

7

picks up the same language and provides that to

8

establish a contract in (inaudible) or a quasi

9

contract, that the Plaintiff must show, one, the

10

Defendant receive the benefit, two, an appreciation of

11

the knowl edge by the Defendant of the benefit.
Three, under the circumstances that would make

12
13

it unjust for the Defendant to retain the benefit

14

without paying for it, as the implied in law aspect, to

15

imply -- to establish a contract implied in fact, the

16

Plaintiff must show, one, Defendant requested the

17

|

Plaintiff to perform the work, two, the Plaintiff

18

expected the Defendant to compensate him or her for

19

those services, and, three, Defendant knew or should

20

have known that the Plaintiff expected compensation.

21

It seems to the Court that the Steven R. Young

22

affidavit really supersedes the pleadings in the

23

complaint and that they state what the -- they state

24

the facts as being asserted by the - - b y the Plaintiff

25

that are -- that are being presented to the Court to
T \ r « n / \ i JT i -*r n r » n A T ^ n n T V T i n
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defeat the motion.
And it seems to me that, reading paragraphs
six and seven together, there isn't any question that
Defendant did not request the Plaintiff to perform the
work, that's something that is (inaudible) recognized
in paragraph six.
And I think reading six and seven together I
find nothing there to warrant the doctrine of implied
contract, in fact, I would rely on the language which
is referred to the Court from the restatement of
restitution, but I think that's consistent with the law
in the state of Utah.
It seems to me what we have here is an
incidental benefit, that a developer can impose costs
on a passive landowner, because in order to obtain the
benefit that the developer wishes, he must - - h e must
perform that incidentally benefits someone else.

I

think that's the law here, and I think that that
defeats the argument being made by the -- by the
Plaintiff.
On the issue of statute of limitations, again,
though I rely upon these secondarily, it seems to me
that there has been a basis made to dismiss on the
statute of limitation claims as well, but I take that
as being secondary to what I believe to be the decision

lvjuiiii-rage
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on the merits.
On the issue of whether or not there was
equity, there's certainly an argument that there was no
equity on the part of the developer, but I think
that's -- that's not a necessary element of the Court's
decision here.

Mr. Call, would you prepare an order

consistent with my ruling?
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

I will, Your Honor.
All right.

We'll be in recess.

Page 57
CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

*
* ss .

County of Salt Lake

*

I, MINDY L. NELSON, do hereby certify that
the foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 56, contain a
true and accurate transcript of the electronically
recorded proceedings held in connection with
Development Associates, Inc. vs. Gene Peaden held on
September 23, 2002 at 10:30 a.m., and was transcribed
by me to the best of my ability from the cassette tape
furnished to me.
Dated this 1st day of March, 2.003.

T ^ L •iids^
Mindy L. Nelson, Transcriber
I, RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary
Public for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that
the foregoing transcript prepared by Mindy L. Nelson
was transcribed under my supervision and direction.

Renee L. Stacy, CSR, RPR

Hearing Transcript
(Order)

Page 1
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF UTAH

* * * * *

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES,

*

INC. ,
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*
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vs.

*

Case No.

GENE PEADEN,

*

Defendant.

f

020902121

*

*

*

*

*

*

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 23rd day of

December 2, 2002, commencing at the hour of 9:15 a.m.,

the Hearing in the above-entitled matter was held
at the above-entitled Court, Salt Lake City, Utah.
This Hearing was electronically recorded.

Multi-Page
Page 2
A P P E A R A N C E S

RALPH J. MARSH

For the Plaintiff:

Attorney at Law
68 South Main #800
Salt Lake City, UT

84101

STEVEN W. CALL

For the Defendant:

Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4 5385
Salt Lake City, UT

WILLIAM B. BOHLING

Judge:

*

*

* *

84145
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

We're on record in the matter of

3

Development Associates, Inc. vs. Gene Peaden, Case No.

4

020902121.

5

please?

6
7

Counsel, would you enter your appearances,

MR. CALL:

Steve Call, Your Honor, on behalf

of the Defendant, Gene Peaden.

8

MR. MARSH:

9

Development Associates, Inc.

10

THE COURT:

11

filed by Mr. Marsh.

12

argument.

13

MR. MARSH:

Ralph Marsh for the Plaintiff,

We're here to hear some objections
Mr. Marsh, we'll hear your

Thank you, Your Honor.

I should

14

state that Mr. Call has revised his proposed order a

15

couple of times, in fact, I guess three times based on

16

some objections that I made, and many of my objections

17

have been actually resolved.

18

And I understand that in preparing this order

19

he's able to make a statement of the facts as he

20

believes the Court found.

21

because I think some of his statements were not quite

22

accurate, and I just wanted to get those objections on

23

the record.

24
25 (

And I've simply objected,

And if the Court wants to go ahead and enter
that order, that's up to the Court, but I still wanted
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to make sure my objections were on the record.

2
3
4

THE COURT:

It's really appropriate, of

MR. MARSH:

Okay.

course.
And I think my written

5

objections pretty well state the objection that I made.

6

This is a Motion to Dismiss in which the Court and the

7

parties must accept all of the allegations in the

8

complaint as if they are true.

9

And, therefore, I have simply stated that

10

those are the facts in this case, and any attempt to

11

recite facts or to find facts is -- is not appropriate,

12

because the facts are as stated in the complaint, and

13

he has selected facts here and there, as he desired, to

14

support the decision, but left out some that I think

15

are relevant.

16
17
18

And so that's my main objection.

But, for example, in my paragraph two I have
objected to his paragraph five in which -THE COURT:

Now, let me just be sure I've got

19

the right document, because there have been a number of

20

these filed.

21

MR. MARSH:

Okay.

22

THE COURT:

There is one called Objection to

23

Proposed Revised Order that's missing cases.

24

where we're at, or is there another one since then?

O c; I
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THE COURT:
2

And then the.re's an Obj ection to

Proposed Second Revised C>rder; is that where you re at?

3

MR. MARSH:

That 's where I'm at.

4

THE COURT:

All right.

5

MR. MARSH:

And I should point out that I

Thank you.

6

think Mr . Call prep;=ired aL third - - third revised order,

7

and I

8
9

revised order --

10

MR. CALL:

11

THE COURT:

12

Do you have a copy of that 1:h ird

THE COURT:

I do.
-- because I don't think that's

reached the file yet?

13

MR. CALL:

I do, I do.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. MARSH:

And I did not, according to my

16

file, file an additional objection after that third

17

revised order, and so my objections are still based on

18

my document entitled Objection to Proposed Second

19

Revised Order.

20

He did not make all of the changes that I

21

made, but, nevertheless, he did remove one that I

22

thought was objectionable, and that was he had asked

23

for some affirmative relief, which I didn't think was

24

appropriate on a Motion to Dismiss.

25

to any affirmative relief because we're the complainina

He's not entitled
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1

party, of course.

2

longer relevant.

3

So that -- that objection is no

But he simply made some statements in his

4

findings that were not totally true, some of them based

5

on some statements that I made before the Court in our

6

oral argument.

7

his memory of what my statements were, and I don't know

8

that he obtained a transcript of the hearing.

9

And, of course, they're made based on

And so I've simply stated -- restated in my

10

objection what I actually said to the Court.

11

example, in my paragraph four, objecting to paragraph

12

nine of the so-called undisputed facts, he stated that

13

Plaintiff's Counsel represented to the Court at the

14

hearing that Plaintiff would have previously removed

15

its notice of interest against Defendant's property had

16

such request been made, because the improvements had

17

not been made to numerous lots at the time the notice

18

of interest was filed.

19

For

I did not make that statement quite that way.

20

I recited what I did state.

21

notice of interest against Defendant's property would

22

have been removed had a request to do so been made by

23

Defendant pursuant to the wrongful lien statute, as

24

Plaintiff had done in other cases where lot owners had
— ^ ,-. +- ^ ^
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Under that wrongful lien statute, there's a
provision that says you have to give a twenty day
notice to the party to remove that so-called wrongful
lien, and if they don't remove it in that twenty days
then you have a cause of action against them.

No such

request was ever made about under that wrongful lien
statute, and that's what I stated before the Court.
I did not ever state that the notice would
have been removed because no improvements had been made
to the lots.

That's a statement I did not make, and

yet he's included it in his findings.

And so I'm just

clarifying what I actually said before the Court.
In paragraph two of my objections, again,
objecting to paragraph five of the proposed undisputed
facts, he's referring to the affidavit of Steven Young.
In fact, the affidavit does not state that the
Defendant, Peaden, did not agree or represent that he
would pay for the improvements.
And it further states in paragraph seven, this
is quoting from the affidavit of Mr. Young, that Mr.
Peaden was also contacted and acknowledged the need to
install such improvements, and the benefit to him by
doing so, and encouraged us to proceed with the
installation of such improvements.
Furthermore, in the complaint we've alleged
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1

that Defendant acknowledged the need to install such

2

improvements and that such improvements would benefit

3

him and increase the value of the lots owned by him,

4

and encouraged and requested Plaintiff to proceed with

5

the installation of such improvements.

6

All I'm saying is that that's what the

7

complaint says, which must be taken as true for

8

purposes of a Motion to Dismiss.

9

looks at the affidavit, which is unopposed, the finding

And if the Court

10

must be what the affidavit states and not the way that

11

Mr. Call has worded it with his order.

12

I don't know that I need to go through each

13

one of these objections, except to state that I -- I've

14

just made some corrections.

15

five he refers to the notice -- or to the -- the

16

pre-building permit report which was submitted to the

17

Court, and then made a conclusion that -- first, that

18

most of the improvements had been installed according

19

to that report without changes that, in this third

20

revised order, to many of the improvements.

21

For example, in paragraph

And I'm simply saying, all that report says is

22

that some improvements were made, and he cannot

23

conclude that most of them were in or any number of

24

them were in, because there is no reference to what was

25 I recruired, only that some improvements had been
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installed.

That's -- That's all I'm objecting to in

that paragraph.
Then in my paragraph seven I'm objecting to
paragraph -- well, seven and eight, I'm objecting to
paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the proposed order in which
Mr. Call makes the statement that the Court concluded
that the Plaintiff is guilty of unclean hands in
equity.
I wrote down in my notes, when the Court
issued its order, that that was not part of the Court's
decision, and so I simply make an objection based on
that statement that I wrote down in my notes from the
Court's ruling from the bench, unclean hands in equity
is not part of the decision.
And my paragraph nine is the one which refers
to the affirmative relief which he had set forth in his
order, but which he has removed from his latest version
of the order.
So -- And, again, my objections are made
simply to put on the record my feelings that the order
does not accurately recite either what the Court's
ruling from the bench was or what the facts were,
because the facts must be taken as true as stated in
the complaint.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Marsh.

Mr. Call.
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MR. MARSH:

First, Your Honor, with respect to

2

the facts, let me say that in drafting the order I did

3

try to follow the Court's ruling, and the Court

4

addressed this issue in its ruling in discussing the

5

distinction between the allegations in the complaint

6

and the affidavit that was filed by the Plaintiff's

7

President.

8
9

And if I could just read from his paragraph
six, because the Court included that in its ruling, he

10

testifies -- and, again, he's the President of the

11

Plaintiff, and we're dealing with improvements that

12

were made, and the paragraph disputed has to do with

13

whether or not there's something erroneous with the

14

Court's conclusion that there was no agreement for

15

these improvements to be made -- and he testifies,

16

before doing so we tried to contact all of the owners

17

of the other lots to either purchase their lots or

18

obtain their agreement to participate in the cost of

19

improvements.

20

All of the other owners, either before or

21

after improvements were completed, acknowledged the

22

benefit to them of the improvements and agreed either

23

to sell their lots or to participate in the cost on a

24

prorata basis, except for the owners of the eight lots,

Page ll|
And this Court concluded, based on that
affidavit, that it was clear from his testimony that,
in fact, he is indicating that my client, the
Defendant, did not agree to pay for those improvements,
it's laid out specifically in the President's
affidavit.
Counsel argued that the Court should ignore
the affidavit and look solely to the complaint, and the
Court addressed that, and I -- the language in the
proposed order I believe reflects nearly precisely the
Court's -- the spirit of the Court's ruling, and it
says that, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to -- let's
see •-- at the hearing before the Court, the Court
clarified, and Defendant's Counsel confirmed, that the
issue of timeliness was not at issue, that the Court's
ruling should be based on the merits of the case.

Just

get the record right here.
The Court has considered the sworn affidavit
of Steven Young.

I'm now in conclusion fifteen of the

proposed third order.

The Court has considered the

sworn affidavit of Steven Young and other extraneous
materials, and, therefore, Defendant's motion may be
considered a Motion for Summary Judgment.
However, even without the consideration of the
affidavit and other extraneous materials, there are
TYEn>n\*Av pi?prii? r rrMri rwr 1 fsm>> ^ 9 C - i i 2 £
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1

grounds which would sustain dismissal of all or part of

2

the Plaintiff's complaint based upon the uncontested

3

documents from the public records which were attached

4

as exhibits to the Defendant's support memorandum, that

5

being the statute of limitations and the undisputed

6

fact that the notice of interest was recorded against

7

my client's property before any of the improvements

8

made thereto were made.

9

And the Court indicated that, well, whether

10

it's a Motion to Dismiss or whether it's a Motion for

11

Summary Judgment, the Court said, I believe that I can

12

take into consideration the sworn affidavit that was

13

filed by the Plaintiff's President in connection with

14

the motions pending before the Court.

15

And, as such, the order states -- the Court

16

indicated that when read together, those two

17

paragraphs, that it is clear -- if I can find it

18

'here.-- paragraph six of the sworn affidavit of Steven

19

Young clarifies that the Defendant, Peaden, did not

20

agree or represent to the Plaintiff that he would pay

21

for the improvements to the development made or to be

22

made by the Plaintiff.

23

ruled after considering the affidavit.

24

It's precisely what the Court

The Court addressed the issue as to the

25 I distinction of the affidavit and the complaint and said
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that it could consider the affidavit, which was filed
after the complaint.
With respect to the other objection that was
made, Counsel represented to the Court that, yes, this
notice of interest was filed before any improvements
were made.
That is, in his objection of the proposed
order, he stated, no, that's not exactly what I said,
what I really said was we did record the interest
before the improvements were made to Plats B and C, but
not to Plat A.
I've revised th e order to deal with that
objection.

All of my cl ient's lots were in Plats B and

C, so I don't really thi nk it was extremely relevant to
the issue, but I've made that change nevertheless
I have further changed his objection to
paragraph nine that stated that -- that there was some
objection because he had represented that they would
have removed the notice of interest had a request been
made.
And, of course, the whole purpose there is
he's saying, because the improvements hadn't been made
at the time the notice o f interest was filed, we would
have removed it.

I put that in the proposed order and

1 Counsel objected and said, no, that's not exactly what
DEPOMAX REPORTING. INC TXOn TOM1RR

|
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I said, what I said is if they would have made a
request that it be removed under the wrongful lien
statute that I would have removed it.
Well, the wrongful lien statute wasn't really
enacted until after the notice of interest was filed.
But I don't think it's really relevant, so I included
the language that Counsel in the third r€>vised order,
so I don't see that as being any further issue.
In addition, I had indicated the Court's -the spirit of the Court's ruling that the notice of
interest shouldn't have been filed because the
improvements hadn't been made, and that the appropriate
method for obtaining a lien against property is through
the mechanic's lien statute, which we discussed before
the Court.
Counsel has indicated that there should be no
affirmative relief in the order of dismissal.

I don't

necessarily agree that that has to be, but we can file
a separate action to expunge the (inaudible) on the
property if that's what he wants, I'm happy to do that.
So, rather than clutter the order, I have
removed those paragraphs from the order.

The revised

order had indicated that the Court had concluded that
that was the appropriate method for filing a notice of
lien, and stated that the notice of lien, which is

Page 15
still recorded against our property even after this
Court's ruling, that -- that it should be removed.
Counsel has indicated no, it shouldn't be removed,
the Court cannot grant affirmative relief on a Motion
to Dismiss, but all you can do for summary judgment is
just dismiss the Plaintiff's claims.
I don't agree with that, but I'm happy to file
a separate action, we have other damages that need to
be addressed.

And so I have removed those provisions

from the third revised amended order.
With respect to unclean hands, Your Honor, I
believe that the Court ruled, as I understood the
Court, the Court ruled that this was simply not an
action in restitution, that there was no basis for
equity.
That was the Court's primary basis for its
ruling.

The Court then, as an alternative, indicated

that even if there were -- even if this were a claim
for equity, it does appear that you're barred by the
statute of limitations, because your notice of interest
was filed in January of 1997, the other -- the report
from the City indicates that the improvements were made
sometime during that year, yet your action wasn't
commenced until more than four years after the end of
that 1997 period, which would have required that the
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188
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action be filed sometime before March of 1998.
So it would appear that the statute of
limitations would bar your claim even if you had stated
a claim in equity for unjust enrichment.
And then finally, with respect to unclean
hands, the unclean hands ruling, as I understood it,
and I disagree with Counsel, I guess this is the only
issue that appears to be clearly disputed, is that it
was my understanding that the Court acknowledged that
1 the lien had not been rightfully recorded based on
Counsel's submission, and that it had -- it did not
have clean hands, having come to this Court and asked
for equity having intentionally filed a notice of
interest against Plats B and C, which included my
client's properties, knowing that there had been no
improvements made to those lots.
And in our reply memorandum we had cited that
a party seeking equity must do so with clean hands.

We

cited two Supreme Court decisions wherein the Supreme
Court stated that the doctrine has been described as
follows:

Under this maximum any willful act in regard

to the matter in litigation which would be condemned or
pronounced wrongful by the honest and fair-minded men
will be sufficient to make the hands of the Applicant
1 unclean.
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There is no dispute in the proceeding before

1
2

this Court, based upon the pleadings and the admission

3

of Counsel, that a notice of interest against my

4

client's lots was filed in January of 1997.

5

been a certified copy submitted to the Court.

There has

It is undisputed that at the time that

6
7

interest was recorded that there had been no

8

improvements made against my client's properties, and,

9

as such, it was a wrongful lien, did not comply with

10

the mechanic's lien statute or any other statute that

11

allows for the filing of a lien.
We asserted to the Court that was indeed

12
13

unclean hands and that it did not -- the Plaintiff have

14

a claim in unjust enrichment.

15

ruled they didn't have a claim in unjust enrichment.

16

And we consider that to be a third alternative to the

17

Court's ruling.

18

with the Court's ruling.

The Court had already

So I believe all of that is in harmony

We did, in attempt to conserve judicial

19
20

resources and resolve this issue, I did -- I did make

21

revisions to orders and try to get an order that was

22

acceptable to Counsel, and I have filed and served the

23

Defendant's third revised proposed order, I am

24

comfortable with it, I am happy to defend it on appeal,

25 1

and, as such, I would ask the Court to sign and enter

nRPAXA A v x>v:r^r\T>rrTK\n TXT/^ / C A I \ ?ot>_i 1 ©t>
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that order.
THE COURT:

Counsel, the only question I have

from the argument is, is there some reason why it
wouldn't be helpful to treat this as the summary
judgment so that that affidavit could clearly be
considered?
MR. CALL:

Yes.

I think it should, Your

Honor, and that's why I've made the specific findings.
There was an objection that we had laid out findings.
Rule 54 expressly provides that the Court, on a
Motion to Dismiss or on a Motion for Summary Judgment
under Rule 56, may make findings and conclusions.

In

fact, it said -- it says it doesn't have to unless the
Court makes its ruling based on alternative grants.
And, in this case, the Court did make
alternative rulings, and so I think it is appropriate.
So I have indicated what the Court has indicated, and
that is that it's either -- if you go to paragraph one
of the Order of Judgment on page seven, Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, which was converted, at least in
part, to a Motion for Summary Judgment, is hereby
granted.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Right.
And that's what the Court ordered

and that's -- and I tried to get the lancruacre iust --
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1

I've worked with lawyers that try to monkey with

2

things, and that isn't the intent here, I tried to get

3

something that reflected the Court's ruling, and I

4

believe that I've done it at this point.

5

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Marsh?

6

MR. MARSH:

Just a brief response, Your Honor,

7

with respect to the equity argument.

8

the Court can include anything it wishes in its order,

9

but I'm simply quoting from my notes taken at the time

10

And I understand

that you ruled from the bench.
After it made its ruling with respect to the

11
12

implied in fact contract and the statute of

13

limitations, it said that there is no equity, it's

14

true, but that's not part of my decision.
I wrote that down, and that's -- that was the

15
16

basis for my objection to his conclusion of anything

17

with respect to equity and unclean hands.

18

it I submit based on my objections.
THE COURT:

19

Thank you, Mr. Marsh.

The rest of

Well,

20

Counsel, this is -- I appreciate, frankly, the

21

scholarship of both sides in trying to refine its

22

order.

It's a complicated area.

23

I'm comfortable at this point, frankly, with

24

the order that Mr. Call has prepared, and I think I'm

25

going to overruled the objections that have been made
DEPOMAX REPORTING. INC (801) 328-1188
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to it, recognizing that there has beenL a grreat deal of
give and take in ge tting the order to the Court as
stated.
So, what I 'm going to do I think is si mply
take whiteout and remove that third revise.d, because
that will -MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
away

Oh, that would be great.
-- you know, that would take that

And then that will permit me tc just go ahead

and <snter the order* now so everybody knows it' s been
done and we can go from there.
I've gone ahead and executed the order that
was ;just submitted to me, the third or•der.

And , again,

appreciate Counsel' s, on both sides, your very
comp<stent work in this matter
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you
We're in recess.

mum-rage
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Rest. Of Restitution
Section 106

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
OF

RESTITUTION
QUASI CONTRACTS
AND

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

AS ADOPTED AND PROMULGATED
BY THE

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
AT WASHINGTON, D. C.
MAY 8, 1936

1937
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PUBLISHERS
ST. PAUL

Ch.3
§ 106.

COERCION

§106

INCIDENTAL BENEFIT TO ANOTHER FROM
PERFORMANCE OF ONE'S DUTY OR PROTECTION OF ONE'S THINGS.

A person who, incidentally to the performance
of his own duty or to the protection or the improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to contribution.
Comment:
a. Sections 76-105 deal with situations in which
indemnity or contribution is granted to a person who,
in the performance of his own duty or in the protection of his own interests, confers a benefit upon another. There is, however, no principle which is generally applicable by which restitution is granted to one
who has been coerced by the existence of a duty or a
danger to his own interests into doing an act which is
beneficial to another.
Illustrations:
1. A, the owner of land on a river bank, reasonably fearing immediate inundation, requests
his neighbor, B, to join him in building a dike
which will preserve the land of both. B refuses.
A builds a dike which saves both pieces of land
from being flooded. A is not entitled to contribution from B.
2. A and B are adjoining mine owners
whose mines have been flooded by seepage from
a near-by swamp. A requests B to join him in
the draining of the swamp. B refuses. A drains
the swamp, thereby drying both mines. He is
not entitled to contribution from B.
445

§ 106

RESTITUTION

Ch.3

3. Same facts as in Illustration 2, except
that C had contracted to keep water out of A's
mine, and he drains the swamp in the performance of his duty to A. C is not entitled to contribution from B.
b. The rules as to general average, as that term
is used in admiralty, are not within the scope of the
Restatement of this Subject.
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COPYKIGHT, 1937
BY

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
All rights reserved

Utah R. CIU. P. 12(b)

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 12. Defenses and objections
*

*

*

(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of
such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

